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KILLING WOTUS 2015: WHY THREE RULEMAKINGS MAY NOT 
BE ENOUGH 
STEPHEN M. JOHNSON* 
The rules adopted by federal administrative agencies are influenced 
substantially by the politics of the President. Presidential control of agencies is 
an important factor that has motivated courts to defer to agencies when they 
review agencies’ interpretations of statutes.1 After all, the President, the head of 
the Executive Branch, is directly accountable to the American people through 
elections, whereas judges are not accountable.2 So, when Presidents change, the 
rules and policies of agencies often change.3 Recognizing the important role of 
the President in influencing agencies’ policies, former Supreme Court Chief 
Justice William Rehnquist counseled in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers 
Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., “A change in 
administration brought about by the people casting their votes is a perfectly 
 
* Professor of Law, Mercer University Law School. B.S., J.D. Villanova University, LL.M. George 
Washington University School of Law. 
 1. See Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984). See also, Fla. 
Manufactured Hous. Ass’n v. Cisneros, 53 F.3d 1565, 1577 (11th Cir. 1995); Ransom v. Bowen, 
844 F.2d 1326, 1335 (7th Cir. 1988). For a seminal article discussing the Constitutional and policy 
justifications for strong Presidential control over agency decision-making, see Harold H. Bruff, 
Presidential Power and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.J. 450, 451 (1979). Many other 
academics have focused on the appropriate scope of Presidential control over agency decision-
making. See Stephen M. Johnson, Disclosing the President’s Role in Rulemaking: A Critique of the 
Reform Proposals, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 1003, 1004 (2011) [hereinafter, Johnson, Disclosing the 
President’s Role in Rulemaking]; Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or The Decider? The President in 
Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 750–51 (2007); Kevin M. Stack, The President’s 
Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263, 267 (2006); Elena Kagan, 
Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2372 (2001); Steven G. Calabresi & 
Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 544–45, 
636 (1994); Lawrence Lessig & Cass Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1, 6 (1994). 
 2. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865–66. 
 3. See Jack M. Beermann, Midnight Rules: A Reform Agenda, 2 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. 
L. 285, 289 (2013); Ari Cuenin, Mooting the Night Away: Postinauguration Midnight-Rule 
Changes and Vacatur for Mootness, 60 Duke L.J. 453, 476–77 (2010); Jack M. Beermann, 
Combating Midnight Regulation, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 352, 360 (2009); Jason M. Loring & Liam 
R. Roth, After Midnight: The Durability of the “Midnight” Regulations Passed by the Two Previous 
Outgoing Administrations, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1441, 1444 (2005). 
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reasonable basis for an executive agency’s reappraisal of the costs and benefits 
of its programs and regulations.”4 
However, agencies are not merely the President’s political playthings. 
Justice Rehnquist conditioned his support for politically-based policy changes 
in State Farm by stressing that “a new administration may not refuse to enforce 
laws of which it does not approve, or to ignore statutory standards in carrying 
out its regulatory functions.”5 In addition, while the Supreme Court has 
identified the political accountability of the President as one reason for deferring 
to an agency’s interpretation of a statute, the other primary reasons that courts 
defer to agencies’ interpretations of statutes are because agencies have expertise 
in the subject matter of the statutes and Congress intended agencies to exercise 
that expertise to interpret and administer statutes.6 While Congress occasionally 
enacts legislation that delegates rulemaking or decision-making power directly 
to the President,7 most statutes delegate such authority to administrative 
agencies, presumably because Congress wants agencies to exercise their 
expertise in the subject matter, rather than making decisions based on politics.8 
Basic principles of administrative law limit the President’s ability to change 
rules for purely political reasons. For instance, a rule that has been adopted 
through notice and comment rulemaking can only be repealed or changed 
through notice and comment rulemaking.9 This can be difficult, because 
adopting any rule through notice and comment rulemaking can be time 
consuming and resource intensive.10 Congress and the courts impose many 
procedural requirements on the rulemaking process to ensure that agencies 
engage in a transparent, deliberative process that involves public input and 
generates a rational decision.11 Since agencies can anticipate that most major 
 
 4. 463 U.S. 29, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
 5. Id. 
 6. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865–66. 
 7. See Bruff, supra note 1, at 472. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (2012) (delegating authority to 
the President to revise the national contingency plan under the Superfund law). 
 8. See Johnson, supra note 1, at 1008–10; Stack, supra note 1, at 266–67; Strauss, supra note 
1, at 754. Academics who espouse a “Presidential control” model for administrative agencies, rather 
than an “expertise” model, disagree. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 1, at 2251–52; Kathryn A. Watts, 
Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L. J. 2, 6 (2009). 
 9. See Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 
1993); Nat’l Fam. Plan. & Reprod. Health Ass’n v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227, 235 (D.C. Cir. 1992); 
Envtl. Def. Fund v. Gorsuch, 713 F.2d 802, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
 10. See Stephen M. Johnson, Ossification’s Demise? An Empirical Analysis of EPA 
Rulemaking from 2001-2005, 38 ENVTL. L. 767, 773 (2008) [hereinafter Johnson, Ossification’s 
Demise?]; Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 
DUKE L.J. 1385, 1385–86 (1992) [hereinafter “McGarity, Some Thoughts”]. 
 11. See Johnson, Ossification’s Demise?, supra note 10, at 774–78 (describing the variety of 
procedural requirements imposed by legislation, judicial decisions, and Executive Orders); 
McGarity, Some Thoughts, supra note 10, at 1400–12. See also Aaron L. Nielson, Sticky 
Regulations, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 85, 86–98 (2018) (describing several judicial limits, including 
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regulations will be challenged in court,12 they have an incentive to take as much 
time as is necessary to create a “bulletproof” rule that can withstand judicial 
challenges.13 While many have criticized the modern notice and comment 
rulemaking process as “ossified,”14 others have recognized that the ossification 
creates “sticky regulations” on which the regulated community and the public 
can rely.15 If an agency follows the appropriate procedures and adopts a rule that 
is reasonable and within its statutory authority, the public and the regulated 
community can be assured that the rule cannot be changed based on a whim, but 
can only be changed after a time consuming, resource intensive, deliberative 
process with opportunities for public participation.16 As Professor Aaron 
Nielson notes, “the same procedures that make it hard to create policy also make 
it hard to rescind policy. . . . Ossification thus acts as a commitment mechanism. 
Almost by definition, the more difficult it is for an agency to change its policy, 
the less likely it is that the agency will do so.”17 
 
“hard look” review, the “material comments” doctrine, the “logical outgrowth” doctrine, and the 
“good government” justification for many of the procedural limits on rulemaking); Lisa Schultz 
Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1755 (2007); 
Caitlin McCarthy et al., Dialogue: The Burden of Unburdening: Administrative Law of 
Deregulation, 48 ELR 10767, 10768 (2018). 
 12. See Johnson, Ossification’s Demise?, supra note 10, at 768, 771–73 (discussing studies 
that have found that agency rules are invalidated in 30%–50% of the cases in which they are 
challenged and noting that former EPA Administrator William Ruckleshaus claims that 80% of the 
rules adopted by EPA while he was Administrator were challenged). 
 13. See Nielson, supra note 11, at 98–99. 
 14. See Charles W. Tyler & E. Donald Elliott, Administrative Severability Clauses, 124 YALE 
L.J. 2286, 2328 (2015); Richard J. Pierce Jr., Rulemaking Ossification is Real: A Response to 
Testing the Ossification Thesis, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1493, 1493 (2012); Stephen M. Johnson, 
The Internet Changes Everything: Revolutionizing Public Participation and Access to Government 
Information Through the Internet, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 277, 283–84 (1998) [hereinafter Johnson, 
Internet]; Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to 
Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525, 528–36 (1997) [hereinafter McGarity, Response]; Mark 
Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review 
of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483, 483 (1997); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven 
Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 64 (1995); McGarity, Some 
Thoughts, supra note 10, at 1428–29. One relevant definition of “ossify” is “to make callous, rigid, 
or inactive.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 1597 (1993). 
 15. See Nielson, supra note 11, at 90, 131. See also McCarthy, et al., supra note 11, at 10768. 
 16. See Nielson, supra note 11, at 92. See also McCarthy, et al., supra note 11, at 10770. 
 17. See Nielson, supra note 11, at 116, 118. Justice Neil Gorsuch is less optimistic that 
administrative law principles can adequately prevent agencies from making knee-jerk political 
decisions. While he was a judge on the Tenth Circuit, Gorsuch authored a concurring opinion in 
Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, in which he criticized the deference accorded to agencies under the 
Chevron doctrine, arguing that de novo review was necessary because stakeholders “must always 
remain alert to the possibility that the agency will reverse its current view 180 degrees anytime 
based merely on the shift of political winds and still prevail.” 834 F.3d 1142, 1152 (2016) (Gorsuch, 
J., concurring). Later in the opinion, Gorsuch laments that “an agency can enact a new rule of 
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In addition to the procedural impediments referenced above, the Supreme 
Court has imposed other restrictions on agencies that prevent them from hastily 
changing rules based on political whims. For instance, when an agency changes 
a rule, the agency must “display awareness that it is changing position” and 
“show that there are good reasons for the new policy.”18 In addition, an agency 
must provide a reasoned explanation whenever it disregards facts and 
“circumstances that underlay or were engendered by its prior rule.”19 An agency 
rule can be held to be “arbitrary and capricious” if there is an “unexplained 
inconsistency” in agency policy.20 Consequently, when an agency adopts a rule 
to repeal or replace a prior rule, to the extent that the agency is changing its 
interpretation of the facts or law underlying the prior rule, or, to the extent that 
the new rule conflicts with the agency’s prior interpretation of the facts or law 
underlying the rule, the agency must acknowledge that and rationally explain the 
reasons for the change in interpretation.21  
In light of all of these restrictions, when an agency runs the procedural 
gauntlet of notice and comment rulemaking and adopts a rule that is within the 
agency’s statutory authority, a reasonable exercise of discretion, based on 
agency expertise, and supported by a strong factual record, it is very difficult to 
repeal the rule solely on political grounds, especially if the attempts to repeal the 
rule come shortly after the rule was initially adopted. Nevertheless, when there 
is a change in Administration and the incoming President is a member of a 
different political party than the outgoing President, it is quite common for the 
new President to attempt to repeal or replace rules adopted by the previous 
Administration.22 
This Article illustrates the manner in which the administrative law checks 
and balances work to limit a President’s ability to change a rule based on purely 
political factors, by focusing on a rule adopted in 2015 by the Environmental 
Protection Agency (“EPA”) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) 
and the three rulemaking efforts initiated after the change in Administration in 
2017 to repeal and replace the rule. 
 
general applicability affecting huge swaths of the national economy one day and reverse itself the 
next.” Id. at 1154. 
 18. See Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2126 (2016). 
 19. Id. See also F.C.C. v. Fox TV Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009) (Scalia, J. for the 
plurality). In a concurring opinion in F.C.C. v. Fox TV Stations, Inc., Justice Kennedy wrote, “an 
agency’s decision to change course may be arbitrary and capricious if the agency ignores or 
countermands its earlier factual findings without reasoned explanation for doing so. An agency 
cannot simply disregard contrary or inconvenient facts that it made in the past[.]” Id. at 537 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 20. See Encino, 136 S. Ct. at 2126. 
 21. See William W. Buzbee, The Tethered President: Consistency and Contingency in 
Administrative Law, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1357, 1396, 1401 (2018). 
 22. See Ari Cuenin, supra note 3, at 472. See also infra Part III. 
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The rule was initially adopted by EPA and the Corps in 2015 to define the 
scope of the federal government’s jurisdiction over “waters of the United States” 
(“WOTUS”) under the Clean Water Act.23 The agencies’ rules in effect prior to 
the 2015 rule had been interpreted in, and narrowed by, three Supreme Court 
decisions.24 In the 2015 rule, the agencies crafted a new definition of “waters of 
the United States” based on the agencies’ expertise and their long-standing 
interpretations of those three Supreme Court cases.25 The agencies supported the 
2015 rule with a scientific study that was based on more than 1200 other peer 
reviewed scientific studies26 and an economic analysis that demonstrated that 
the benefits of the rule clearly outweighed the costs of the rule.27 The agencies 
provided the public with more than six months to comment on the rule and 
finalized it after reviewing over a million public comments.28  
Since the American Farm Bureau had led the opposition to the 2015 rule and 
since middle American farmers were major supporters of the President in his 
2016 election, President Trump acted quickly to attempt to eliminate the 2015 
WOTUS rule after he took office in 2017.29 In his second month in office, the 
President issued an Executive Order directing EPA and the Corps to rescind or 
revise the 2015 rule and to revise it in a way that narrowed the government’s 
jurisdiction, based on an interpretation of one of the Supreme Court cases that 
conflicted with the agencies’ prior interpretation of the case.30 
After that, EPA and the Corps initiated three separate rulemakings designed 
to prevent the 2015 rule from being implemented and to repeal and replace that 
rule. The first proposed rulemaking was initiated to repeal the 2015 rule and 
 
 23. See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054, 
37,054 (June 29, 2015) (to be codified 33 C.F.R. pt. 328). 
 24. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 716 (2006); Solid Waste Agency v. United 
States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172, 175 (2001); United States v. Riverside Bayview 
Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 126 (1985). 
 25. See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,054. 
 26. See Connectivity of Streams and Wetlands to Downstream Waters: A Review and Synthesis 
of the Scientific Evidence, EPA (Jan. 2015), https://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/risk/recordisplay.cfm?deid 
=296414 [https://perma.cc/S9C9-EWTB] [hereinafter Connectivity Study]. See Connectivity of 
Streams and Wetlands to Downstream Waters: A Review and Synthesis of the Scientific Evidence, 
80 Fed. Reg. 2100, 2100 (Jan. 15, 2015). 
 27. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency & U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Economic 
Analysis of the EPA-Army Clean Water Rule, ENVTL PROT. AGENCY (May 20, 2015), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-06/documents/508-final_clean_water_rule_eco 
nomic_analysis_5-20-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/DXW5-9VS8]. 
 28. See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,057. 
 29. More than 75% of rural voters in the Farm Belt supported President Trump. See Ted 
Genoways, Farmers voted heavily for Trump. But his trade policies are terrible for them, WASH. 
POST (Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2017/10/24/ 
farmers-voted-heavily-for-trump-but-his-trade-policies-are-terrible-for-them/ [https://perma.cc/H 
W9D-K7BD]. 
 30. See Exec. Order No. 13,778, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,497 (Mar. 3, 2017). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
378 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:373 
reinstate the regulatory landscape that existed prior to the 2015 rule, in order to 
give the agencies time to craft a new rule to replace the 2015 rule.31 When the 
agencies could not finalize that rule quickly enough, they adopted a second rule 
that delayed the implementation of the 2015 rule by two years.32 The third 
proposed rulemaking was initiated to develop the new definition of “waters of 
the United States” to replace the definition adopted in the 2015 rule.33 However, 
the agencies made fundamental errors of administrative law and statutory law in 
each of those rulemakings. One of the agencies’ rules has already been 
invalidated for those errors and the other two will likely be invalidated as well, 
when they are finalized.  
This Article will discuss the procedural and substantive flaws in the three 
rulemaking efforts by the agencies. One or more of the rules (or the 2015 rule) 
will likely be litigated for the next several years and, ultimately, it is likely that 
the question of the scope of the federal government’s jurisdiction over “waters 
of the United States” will return to the Supreme Court. However, since 
challenges to those rules must originate in Federal district courts,34 it could take 
some time before the question returns to the Court. 
Part II of this Article discusses the 2015 rule, including the motivation for 
the rule, the development of the rule, public and congressional reaction to the 
rule, legal challenges to the rule, and President Trump’s reaction to the rule when 
he took office. Part III of the Article discusses the limits imposed on agencies 
when they change regulations and briefly discusses the numerous instances 
when the Trump Administration has failed to comply with those limits. Part IV 
of the Article outlines the efforts taken by the Trump Administration to repeal 
and replace the 2015 rule and Parts V through VII examine the procedural and 
substantive flaws in each of the three rulemaking efforts. Finally, Part VIII 
ponders the fate of a WOTUS rule should one be ultimately reviewed by a 
Supreme Court that has added several new members since the Court last ruled 
on the scope of the Clean Water Act’s jurisdiction over “waters of the United 
States.”  
I.  THE 2015 RULE AND ITS ORIGIN STORY 
EPA and the Corps of Engineers have adopted many regulations over the 
years to define the government’s jurisdiction over “navigable waters” under the 
Clean Water Act. Shortly after Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution 
 
 31. See Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Pre-Existing Rules, 
82 Fed. Reg. 34,899, 34,899 (proposed July 27, 2017) (to be codified 33 C.F.R. 328). 
 32. See Definition of “Waters of the United States” —Addition of an Applicability Date to 
2015 Clean Water Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 5200, 5200 (Feb. 6, 2018). 
 33. See Revised Definition of Waters of the United States, 84 Fed. Reg. 4154, 4154 (Feb. 14, 
2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 110.1). 
 34. See Nat. Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Def., 138 S. Ct. 617 (2018). 
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Control Act Amendments of 1972, the Corps of Engineers adopted a narrow 
definition of “navigable waters” that only covered waters that were currently 
navigable, historically navigable, or potentially navigable.35 That regulatory 
definition was quickly invalidated by the federal district court for the District of 
Columbia in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway.36 In striking 
down the Corps’ definition, the court noted that “Congress by defining the term 
‘navigable waters’ in Section 502(7) of the [Clean Water Act] to mean ‘the 
waters of the United States, including the territorial seas,’ asserted federal 
jurisdiction over the nation’s waters to the maximum extent permissible under 
the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. Accordingly, as used in the [Clean] 
Water Act, the term is not limited to the traditional tests of navigability.”37  
Consistent with the court’s holding, the Corps amended its regulations in 
197538 and 198239 to cover a much broader universe of waters as “navigable 
waters” or “waters of the United States.” The 1982 regulations asserted 
jurisdiction over the traditional navigable waters that were regulated in the 1974 
regulations, but also regulated interstate waters and wetlands; intrastate waters 
the use, degradation, or destruction of which could affect commerce; tributaries 
of any of those waters; and wetlands adjacent to any of those waters.40 The Corps 
amended the regulations again in 1986, but did not make any significant changes 
to the scope of jurisdiction over “waters of the United States” at that time.41 In 
1988, EPA adopted a regulatory definition of “waters of the United States” that 
was substantially the same as the Corps’ definition.42  
Over the past thirty-five years, the Supreme Court reviewed the validity of 
portions of those regulations in three different cases. First, in 1985, in United 
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes the Court considered whether the Clean 
Water Act authorized the Corps of Engineers to regulate, as “waters of the 
 
 35. See Permits for Activities in Navigable Waters or Ocean Waters, 39 Fed. Reg. 12,115, 
12,119 (Apr. 3, 1974) (defining “navigable waters” as “those waters of the United States which are 
subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, and/or are presently, or have been in the past, or may be in 
the future susceptible for use for purposes of interstate or foreign commerce.”). This was the 
definition that the Corps used for the term in the Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899, 
ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1151 (current version at 33 U.S.C. §§ 403–407 (2012). 
 36. 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 1975). 
 37. Id. 
 38. See Navigable Waters; Permits for Activities, 40 Fed. Reg. 31,319, 31,320 (July 25, 1975). 
 39. See Permit Regulations; Interim Rule and Request for Comment, 47 Fed. Reg. 31,794, 
31,797–98 (July 22, 1982). 
 40. See Permits for Discharges of Dredged or Fill Material into Waters of the United States, 
33 C.F.R. § 323.2(a) (1982). 
 41. See Permit Regulations: Regulatory Programs, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,210 (Nov. 13, 
1986). 
 42. See Water Pollution Control: State and Federal 404 Programs, 53 Fed. Reg. 20,764, 20,764 
(June 6, 1988). 
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United States,” wetlands that are adjacent to traditional navigable waters.43 A 
unanimous Court upheld the Corps’ authority in that case, deferring to the 
Corps’ under the Chevron analysis, based on the expertise of the Corps and 
EPA.44 The Riverside Bayview Homes Court held that regulation of adjacent 
wetlands was necessary to achieve the broad purposes of the Clean Water Act 
in Section 101(a) “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological 
integrity of the Nation’s waters,”45 and EPA and the Corps concluded that 
wetlands adjacent to navigable waters “play a key role in protecting and 
enhancing water quality.”46 The Court noted that “the Act’s definition of 
‘navigable waters’ as ‘the waters of the United States’ makes it clear that the 
term ‘navigable’ as used in the Act is of limited import,”47 and the Court further 
supported its conclusion that the government could regulate waters that were not 
“navigable” in the traditional sense by citing legislative history that indicated 
that Congress intended to regulate as broad a category of waters as authorized 
under its Commerce Clause powers.48 
Sixteen years later, in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. 
United States Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC), the Court reviewed the 
Corps’ assertion of jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act over isolated ponds 
based on the agency’s “migratory bird” test.49 The Corps used the test as one 
way to determine whether a water was an intrastate water “the use, degradation 
or destruction of which could affect . . . commerce,” one of the categories of 
“waters of the United States” under the Corps’ regulations.50 Under the test, the 
Corps asserted jurisdiction over intrastate waters which are or would be used by 
migratory birds.51 In a 5–4 decision, the Court rejected the agencies’ calls for 
Chevron deference and read the Clean Water Act narrowly, based on the 
constitutional avoidance canon.52 Under the canon, a court will interpret a statute 
to avoid an interpretation that raises serious constitutional issues unless the 
language of the statute clearly indicates that Congress intended the potentially 
unconstitutional interpretation.53 The Court noted that similar concerns arise 
 
 43. 474 U.S. 121, 123 (1985). 
 44. Id. at 123, 131, 134. 
 45. Id. at 132. 
 46. Id. at 133. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 133, citing S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-1236, p. 144 
(1972); 118 Cong. Rec. 33756-33757 (1972) (statement of Rep. Dingell). 
 49. 531 U.S. 159, 159 (2001). 
 50. Id. at 163. 
 51. Id. at 164. Although the court refers to the Corps’ “migratory bird rule,” the test used by 
the Corps was not a legislative rule, but was merely mentioned in the preamble to the Corps’ 1986 
regulation defining “waters of the United States.” Id. at 184 n.12. 
 52. Id. at 174. 
 53. Id. at 172. 
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when a federal statute encroaches upon traditional state powers.54 Since the 
Court was concerned that regulation of the waters in the case based on the 
migratory bird test raised constitutional issues and encroached on “the States’ 
traditional and primary power over land and water use,” the Court held that the 
Clean Water Act did not authorize such regulation because there was no clear 
statement in the statute that authorized the regulation.55 To the contrary, the 
Court noted that Congress chose to “recognize, preserve and protect the primary 
responsibilities of States . . . to plan the development and use . . . of land and 
water resources” in Section 101(b) of the act.56  
The SWANCC Court distinguished the Riverside Bayview Homes case by 
noting that “the significant nexus between the wetlands and navigable waters” 
informed the Court’s reading of the Clean Water Act in that case.57 In addition, 
contrary to the findings of the Riverside-Bayview Homes Court, the SWANCC 
Court concluded that nothing in the legislative history “signifie[d] that Congress 
intended to exert anything more than its commerce power over navigation,” 
which is presumably narrower than its commerce power generally.58 
Although there were statements in the Court’s opinion that could be read to 
suggest that the Court was doing more than simply invalidating the federal 
government’s regulation of waters based on the “migratory bird” test, EPA and 
the Corps read the opinion narrowly to allow them to continue to regulate 
isolated, intrastate waters on grounds other than the “migratory bird” test,59 and 
most courts read the ruling narrowly to exclude only intrastate, non-navigable 
waters that lacked any connection to navigable waters.60 However, guidance 
issued by EPA and the Corps after the decision required staff to obtain approval 
from Headquarters before asserting jurisdiction over isolated, intra-state, non-
navigable waters61 and situations in which the agencies asserted jurisdiction over 
 
 54. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty., 531 U.S. at 172–73 (2001). 
 55. Id. at 174. 
 56. Id. (citing 33 U.S. C. § 1251(b) (2012)). 
 57. Id. at 167 (emphasis added). 
 58. Id. at 168 n.3. 
 59. See EPA & Corps, Joint Memorandum, 68 Fed. Reg. 1995, 1996 (Jan. 15, 2003). Shortly 
after the SWANCC ruling, the EPA General Counsel and Corps Chief Counsel issued a joint 
memorandum that indicated that the agencies could regulate isolated, intrastate, non-navigable 
waters if the agencies could demonstrate, on a case by case basis, a nexus to interstate commerce 
other than the “migratory bird” test. See STEPHEN M. JOHNSON, WETLANDS LAW: A COURSE 
SOURCE 114–15 (eLangdell Press, 3d ed. 2018) [hereinafter “JOHNSON, COURSE SOURCE”]. That 
memorandum was superseded by the 2003 guidance, which required staff to take a more cautious 
approach to regulating isolated waters. 
 60. See Bradford C. Mank, The Murky Future of the Clean Water Act After SWANCC: Using 
a Hydrological Connection Approach to Saving the Clean Water Act, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 811, 811, 
814, 866 (2003). 
 61. See EPA & Corps, Joint Memorandum, supra note 59, at 1996. 
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those waters declined significantly after SWANCC.62 The Court’s decision 
raised considerable concern among environmental groups because, depending 
on how broadly the Court’s decision was applied, between 40–80% of the 
Nation’s wetlands could be excluded from coverage under the Clean Water Act, 
and many States were not choosing to regulate the waters excluded from federal 
protection.63 
The final Supreme Court case to address the scope of Clean Water Act 
jurisdiction over “waters of the United States” raised more questions than it 
answered. In Rapanos v. United States, the Court was reviewing the Corps’ 
exercise of jurisdiction over non-navigable tributaries of traditional navigable 
waters and wetlands adjacent to those non-navigable tributaries.64 While all of 
the Justices agreed that jurisdiction was not limited to traditional navigable 
waters,65 they agreed on little else. Writing for a plurality of the Court, Justice 
Scalia asserted that the federal government could only regulate, as “waters of 
the United States,” “relatively permanent, standing or flowing bodies of water” 
and “wetlands with a continuous surface connection” to other “waters of the 
United States.”66 Scalia relied on the plain meaning of the term “waters of the 
United States” and argued that it was necessary to interpret federal jurisdiction 
narrowly in light of the statute’s policy, in Section 101(b), “to recognize, 
preserve and protect the primary responsibilities of States . . . to plan the 
development and use . . . of land and water resources.”67 The plurality felt that 
the Corps’ assertion of jurisdiction over non-navigable tributaries as defined in 
its regulations and wetlands without a continuous surface connection to other 
“waters of the United States” raised the same federalism and Commerce Clause 
concerns as the regulation of the isolated ponds in SWANCC.68 The other five 
Justices on the Court rejected the plurality’s narrow reading of Clean Water Act 
jurisdiction.  
 
 62. See Mank, supra note 60, at 814. The agencies significantly reduced the cases in which 
they asserted jurisdiction over vernal pools and playa lakes after SWANCC, despite their ecological 
value. Id. 
 63. See JOHNSON, COURSE SOURCE, supra note 59, at 114–15 (citing Jon Kusler, State 
Regulation of Wetlands to Fill the Gap 6 (Association of State Wetlands Managers, Inc., 2004), 
https://www.as wm.org/pdflib/swancc_decision_030404.pdf [https://perma.cc/GK3Z-BTC2]). 
 64. 547 U.S. 715, 728, 730 (2006). 
 65. See id. at 731 (Scalia, J., for the plurality) (noting that jurisdiction extends beyond 
traditional navigable waters); id. at 779–80 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (finding jurisdiction 
whenever a water has a significant nexus to a traditional navigable water); id. at 788 (Stevens, J, 
dissenting) (indicating that the Corps’ regulations, which assert jurisdiction over a wide range of 
waters beyond traditional navigable waters, should have been upheld under Chevron). 
 66. Id. at 739, 742. Justice Scalia was joined by Justices Thomas and Alito and the Chief 
Justice. Scalia argued that the term “waters of the United States” does not include “channels through 
which water flows intermittently or ephemerally.” Id. at 739. 
 67. 547 U.S. at 737. 
 68. Id. at 759, 776. 
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Justice Kennedy, writing separately, concurred in the Court’s decision to 
remand the case to the lower court, but he took issue with the plurality’s reading 
of the statute. Kennedy argued that Riverside Bayview Homes and SWANCC 
both established the principle that regulation of waters is appropriate under the 
Clean Water Act when the waters have a “significant nexus” to traditional 
navigable waters.69 He rejected the plurality’s tests because they excluded 
regulation of some waters that have a “significant nexus” to traditional navigable 
waters and because they authorized regulation of some waters that lacked such 
a “significant nexus.”70 Addressing the plurality’s concerns about the Clean 
Water Act policy in Section 101(b) to preserve traditional State responsibilities 
over land and water resource development, Kennedy argued that such concerns 
only arose in SWANCC because the federal government attempted to regulate 
waters that lack a “significant nexus” to traditional navigable waters.71 The 
“significant nexus,” he reasoned, should be assessed in terms of the goals and 
purposes of the Clean Water Act in Section 101(a) to “restore and maintain the 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”72  
Accordingly, he wrote that “wetlands possess the requisite nexus, and thus 
come within the statutory phrase ‘navigable waters,’ if the wetlands, either alone 
or in combination with similarly situated lands in the region, significantly affect 
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other covered waters more 
readily understood as ‘navigable.’”73 Justice Kennedy indicated that the Corps 
could, by regulation, “identify categories of tributaries that, due to their volume 
of flow (either annually or on average), their proximity to navigable waters, or 
other relevant considerations, are significant enough that wetlands adjacent to 
them are likely, in the majority of cases, to perform important functions for an 
aquatic system” to justify regulation as “navigable waters.”74 However, he felt 
that the Corps existing regulatory definition of tributaries was too broad, and 
allowed the Corps to assert jurisdiction over wetlands that were adjacent to 
tributaries in some cases where the wetlands, alone or in combination with 
similarly situated lands in the region, lacked a significant nexus to a traditional 
navigable water.75 Consequently, he indicated that the Corps could regulate 
 
 69. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 759, 767, 779 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Kennedy argued “to give 
the term ‘navigable’ some meaning, the Corps’ jurisdiction over wetlands depends upon the 
existence of a significant nexus between the wetlands in question and navigable waters in the 
traditional sense.” Id. at 779. 
 70. Id. at 767–78 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 71. Id. at 776, 782 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Kennedy reasoned that “in most cases regulation 
of wetlands that are adjacent to tributaries and possess a significant nexus with navigable waters 
will raise no serious constitutional or federalism difficulty.” Id. at 782. 
 72. Id. at 779 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 73. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 780 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 74. Id. at 781. (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 75. Id. 
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wetlands adjacent to non-navigable tributaries, but that they could not rely on 
the existing regulation to do so, and would need to demonstrate, on a case-by-
case basis, that the wetlands had a “significant nexus” to a traditional navigable 
water.76  
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer in dissent, 
argued that the Corps’ regulation of non-navigable tributaries and wetlands 
adjacent to non-navigable tributaries should have been upheld under Chevron as 
a reasonable interpretation of the statute, in light of its goals in Section 101(a).77 
Stevens reasoned that the Corps determined that wetlands adjacent to tributaries 
of traditional navigable waters preserve the quality of the Nation’s waters by 
providing habitat for aquatic animals, preventing excessive sediment and toxic 
pollutants from entering the adjacent waters, and reducing downstream flooding 
and that the Corps’ reasonable interpretation of the term “waters of the United 
States” was entitled to Chevron deference.78 The dissenting Justices argued that 
the test for Clean Water Act jurisdiction should be broader than either the 
plurality test or the Kennedy “significant nexus” test. However, Justice Stevens 
noted that “[g]iven that all four Justices who have joined this opinion would 
uphold the Corps’ jurisdiction in . . . all . . . cases in which either the plurality’s 
or Justice Kennedy’s test is satisfied—on remand each of the judgments should 
be reinstated if either of those tests is met.”79 
Chief Justice Roberts wrote a separate concurring opinion to add a few 
thoughts about the impact of the case and the agencies’ potential responses to 
the case. First, he chided the Corps and EPA for failing to amend their regulatory 
definition of “waters of the United States” after SWANCC, indicating that the 
agencies would have been given “generous leeway” by the courts under Chevron 
when reviewing the agencies’ amended regulatory definition.80 Then, he 
lamented that since there was no majority opinion in Rapanos, “[l]ower courts 
and regulated entities will now have to feel their way on a case-by-case basis.”81 
Roberts cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Marks v. United States as a 
guideline for determining the precedential value of a case with no majority 
opinion.82 In Marks, the Court suggested that “[w]hen a fragmented Court 
decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of 
five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by 
those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.”83 
 
 76. Id. at 782. 
 77. Id. at 787–88 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 78. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 787–88. 
 79. Id. at 810 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 80. Id. at 757–58 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 81. Id. at 758 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). 
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EPA and the Corps responded to the Court’s fractured opinion in a 2008 
guidance document that adopted the approach suggested by the dissenting 
Justices, asserting jurisdiction whenever either the Kennedy or plurality test was 
satisfied.84 Despite the Chief Justice’s concerns regarding the difficulty of 
interpreting Rapanos, lower courts have been fairly uniform in applying the 
Kennedy test as the decisive test for jurisdiction or in finding that jurisdiction 
exists whenever either the Kennedy or plurality test is met.85 Nine circuits have 
now addressed the issue and none of the circuits has held that the plurality test 
is the exclusive test for jurisdiction.86  
Although the courts routinely upheld the agencies’ interpretation of 
Rapanos, the agencies’ 2008 guidance required them to undertake a time 
consuming, resource intensive process to evaluate, on a case-by-case basis, 
whether several categories of waters had a “significant nexus” to navigable 
waters to justify regulation.87 The “guidance documents did not provide the 
public or agency staff with information to ensure timely, consistent and 
predictable jurisdictional determinations.”88 In light of Justice Kennedy’s 
suggestion, in Rapanos, that the agencies could identify categories of waters that 
have a “significant nexus” to navigable waters, and the Chief Justice’s 
suggestion, in his Rapanos concurrence, that the agencies would be afforded 
generous leeway by courts if they interpreted the Clean Water Act through 
regulations, EPA and the Corps initiated notice and comment rulemaking in 
 
 84. See U.S. EPA & U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Clean Water Act Jurisdiction Following 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision in Rapanos v. United States & Carabell v. United States (Dec. 
2, 2008) (“Rapanos Guidance’’), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-02/documents/ 
cwa_jurisdiction_following_rapanos120208.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NW6-ZT72]. 
 85. See JOHNSON, COURSE SOURCE, supra note 59, at 141–42; Patrick Parenteau, The Clean 
Water Rule; Not Dead Yet, 48 ENVTL. L. 377, 399–400 (2018); J.B. Ruhl, Proving the Rapanos 
Significant Nexus, 33(1) NAT. RES & ENVT. 1 (2018). The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have held 
that the Kennedy test is the exclusive test for jurisdiction. See United States v. Robison, 505 F.3d 
1208, 1221 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 725 (7th Cir. 
2006). The Fourth and Ninth Circuits have applied the Kennedy test and reserved the question 
whether the plurality test could be an alternative test for jurisdiction. See N. Cal. River Watch v. 
Wilcox, 633 F.3d 766, 769 (9th Cir. 2011); Precon Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 633 
F.3d 278, 288 (4th Cir. 2011). The First, Third, and Eighth Circuits have held that jurisdiction exists 
when either test is met. See United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174, 180 (3d Cir. 2011); United 
States v. Bailey, 571 F.3d 791, 799 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 65–66 
(1st Cir. 2006). The Fifth and Sixth Circuits determined that it was unnecessary to identify the 
required test because the wetlands at issue in the cases they addressed met both tests. See United 
States v. Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200, 208 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Lucas, 516 F.3d 316, 326–
327 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 86. See JOHNSON, COURSE SOURCE, supra note 59, at 142; Parenteau, supra note 85, at 399–
400; Ruhl, supra note 85, at 1. 
 87. See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054, 
37,056 (June 29, 2015) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328). 
 88. Id. 
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2014 to clarify the scope of federal jurisdiction over “waters of the United 
States.”89 The agencies proceeded through rulemaking in order to ensure clarity, 
predictability, and consistency in determining the scope of federal jurisdiction, 
developing categorical rules to replace case-by-case decision-making.90 
During the rulemaking process, the agencies held more than four hundred 
meetings with state and local officials, tribes, farmers, small businesses, and 
other stakeholders, provided a comment period of more than two hundred days, 
and reviewed and responded to more than one million public comments, most of 
which supported the agencies’ final rule.91 The agencies based the final rule on 
the statute, science, their interpretation of the Supreme Court decisions, and their 
experience and technical expertise in administering the statute.92 The primary 
scientific support for the agencies’ rule was provided by the “Connectivity 
Study,” an EPA report that synthesized more than 1200 peer reviewed scientific 
studies and that was reviewed by EPA’s Science Advisory Board.93 The primary 
legal support for the agencies’ rule was the “significant nexus” test from the 
Supreme Court decisions, which Justice Kennedy counseled must be assessed in 
terms of the Clean Water Act’s objectives in Section 101(a) “to restore and 
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s 
waters.”94  
The 2015 rule continued to regulate traditional navigable waters, interstate 
waters, the territorial seas, and impoundments of those waters as “waters of the 
United States.”95 The rule also regulated “tributaries” of traditional navigable 
waters, interstate waters and the territorial seas as “waters of the United 
States.”96 While prior agency regulations regulated tributaries, the agencies did 
not define “tributaries” in the earlier rules.97 The 2015 rule defined “tributaries” 
 
 89. See Definition of “Waters of the United States” Under the Clean Water Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 
22,188, 22,188 (April 21, 2014) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328). 
 90. See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054, 
37,056 (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328). 
 91. Id. at 37,057. 
 92. Id. at 37,054–55. 
 93. Id. at 37,057. See also Connectivity Study, supra note 26. 
 94. See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054, 
37,056, 37,060 (June 29, 2015) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328). See also Parenteau, supra note 
85. 
 95. Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,073–
76. 
 96. Id. at 37,073. 
 97. See Parenteau, supra note 85, at 389. See also William L. Andreen, The Evolution of Water 
Pollution Control in the United States - State, Local, and Federal Efforts, 1789–1972: Part II, 22 
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 215, 267 (2003); Congressional Research Service, “Waters of the United 
States” (WOTUS): Current Status of the 2015 Clean Water Rule (R45424) 2–3 (Updated Dec. 12, 
2018) [hereinafter “CRS Report”]. Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion in Rapanos, 
expressed concern that the definition of tributaries used by the agencies at the time of the Court’s 
decision was likely too broad to serve as a categorical basis for regulating wetlands adjacent to 
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as waters that have a defined bed and banks and an identifiable ordinary high 
water mark and which flow directly or through another water body to a 
traditional navigable water, interstate water or the territorial seas.98 The 
definition did not limit “tributaries” to perennially flowing waters.99 The 
agencies defined “tributaries” as “waters of the United States” because they 
found that Justice Kennedy’s Rapanos opinion allowed the agencies to regulate 
tributaries as a category if they, either alone or in combination with similarly 
situated waters, significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological 
integrity of traditional navigable waters100 and because they determined that 
there was a scientific consensus in the Connectivity Study that tributaries, as 
defined in the final rule, had that significant effect.101 The 2015 rule also defined, 
as “waters of the United States”, “adjacent waters”, including wetlands, ponds, 
lakes, and similar waters that are adjacent to traditional navigable waters, 
interstate waters, the territorial seas, jurisdictional tributaries, or impoundments 
of those waters.102 “Adjacent” was defined in the rule to mean “bordering, 
contiguous, or neighboring,” and was not limited to waters that physically abut 
 
those tributaries. See 547 U.S. at 780–81. In light of that criticism, the 2015 rule adopted a narrower 
definition of “tributaries.” See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 
Fed. Reg. at 37,058. 
 98. See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,076. 
“Ordinary high water mark” is defined as “that line on the shore established by the fluctuations of 
water and indicated by physical characteristics such as a clear, natural line impressed on the bank, 
shelving, changes in the character of soil, destruction of terrestrial vegetation, the presence of litter 
and debris, or other appropriate means that consider the characteristics of the surrounding areas.” 
Id. at 37,126. 
 99. The agencies concluded that the Connectivity Study and SAB review confirmed that 
“[t]ributary streams, including perennial, intermittent and ephemeral streams, are chemically, 
physically, and biologically connected to downstream waters, and influence the integrity of 
downstream waters.” Id. at 37,057. 
 100. Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054, 
37,061 (June 29, 2015) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. 328). The agencies recognized that Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion only explicitly provided that wetlands adjacent to non-navigable tributaries 
could be regulated as “waters of the United States” if the wetlands, either alone or in combination 
with similarly situated wetlands in the region, significantly affect the chemical, physical, and 
biological integrity of traditional navigable waters. Id. However, they concluded that he only 
framed his analysis in terms of wetlands because the case before him involved adjacent wetlands, 
and they concluded that there was no indication in Kennedy’s opinion that the framework for 
evaluating the “significant nexus” for adjacent wetlands should not also apply to tributaries and 
other waters. Id. 
 101. Id. at 37,073. The agencies concluded that “peer-reviewed science and practical 
experience demonstrate that upstream waters . . . significantly affect the chemical, physical and 
biological integrity of downstream waters by playing a crucial role in controlling sediment, filtering 
pollutants, reducing flooding, providing habitat for fish and other aquatic wildlife, and many other 
vital chemical, physical and biological processes.” Id. at 37,055. 
 102. Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,073. 
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other regulated waters.103 As with tributaries, the agencies regulated “adjacent 
waters” in the rule based on a determination that there was a scientific consensus 
that those waters, either alone or in combination with similarly situated waters, 
significantly affected traditional navigable waters.104 In addition to the waters 
that were categorically defined as “waters of the United States,” the 2015 rule 
provided that several other categories of waters could be regulated as “waters of 
the United States” if a case-by-case evaluation determined that they had a 
“significant nexus” to a traditional navigable water.105 Finally, the rule 
 
 103. Id. at 37,080. “Neighboring” includes “all waters located in whole or in part within 100 
feet of the ordinary high water mark of a traditional navigable water, interstate water, the territorial 
seas, an impoundment, or a covered tributary”; “all waters within the 100-year floodplain of a 
traditional navigable water, interstate water, the territorial seas, an impoundment, or a covered 
tributary that is located in whole or in part within 1,500 feet of the ordinary high water mark of that 
jurisdictional water”; and “all waters located in whole or in part within 1,500 feet of the high tide 
line of a traditional navigable water or the territorial seas, and all waters located within 1,500 feet 
of the ordinary high water mark of the Great Lakes.” Id. at 37,081. 
 104. See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,073 
(June 29, 2015) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 382). 
 105. Id. The categories of waters included waters within the 100 year flood plain of traditional 
navigable waters, interstate waters or territorial seas, waters within 4000 feet of the high tide line 
or ordinary high water mark of traditional navigable waters, interstate waters, or territorial seas, 
and five types of isolated wetlands that are “similarly situated.” Id. The isolated wetlands subject 
to case-by-case analysis include prairie potholes, Delmarva and Carolina bays, pocosins, western 
vernal pools in California, and Texas coastal prairie wetlands. Id. The agencies affirmed their long-
standing narrow interpretation of SWANCC as invalidating the migratory bird test, but authorizing 
regulation of non-navigable intrastate “isolated” waters in appropriate instances. Id. at 37,056. The 
agencies chose to regulate the five categories of isolated waters identified in the rule on a case-by-
case basis because they concluded that the wetlands were “similarly situated” for purposes of 
“significant nexus” evaluation, in light of Justice Kennedy’s suggestion, in his Rapanos 
concurrence, that “the significance of wetlands should be evaluated in the aggregate within the 
same region.” See Parenteau, supra note 85, at 393. In determining whether waters are “similarly 
situated”, the agencies consider whether the waters “function alike and are sufficiently close to 
function together in affecting the nearest traditional navigable water, interstate water, or the 
territorial sea.” See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. at 
37,065–66. When evaluating whether the waters are similarly situated “in the region,” the agencies 
determined that “the single point of entry watershed is a reasonable and technically appropriate 
scale for identifying ‘in the region,’” and that a “single point of entry watershed is the drainage 
basin within whose boundaries all precipitation ultimately flows to the nearest single traditional 
navigable water, interstate water, or the territorial sea.” Id. at 37,066. 
Functions to be considered for the purposes of determining significant nexus are sediment 
trapping, nutrient recycling, pollutant trapping, transformation, filtering and transport, 
retention and attenuation of floodwaters, runoff storage, contribution of flow, export of 
organic matter, export of food resources, and provision of life-cycle dependent aquatic 
habitat (such as foraging, feeding, nesting, breeding, spawning, or use as a nursery area) for 
species located in traditional navigable waters, interstate waters, or the territorial seas. 
Id. at 37,091. 
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categorically excluded several waters, including prior converted cropland, waste 
treatment systems, certain ditches, and groundwater.106 
In addition to the overwhelming scientific support for the rule, the agencies 
justified their final rule with an economic analysis that determined that the rule 
would decrease the scope of regulated waters compared to the existing 
regulations and historic practice of making jurisdictional determinations and that 
the annual benefits of the rule would range from $338.9 million to $554.9 
million, compared to annual costs that would range from $158 million to $465 
million.107 The final rule was published on June 29, 2015, with an effective date 
of August 28, 2015.108 Despite the strong scientific and economic basis for the 
rule, the broad public participation in development of the rule, and the 
potentially limited impacts of the rule, the American Farm Bureau Federation, 
Chamber of Commerce, National Association of Manufacturers, and dozens of 
States criticized the rule when it was adopted.109 The critics were concerned that 
the rule would expand federal jurisdiction over “waters of the United States” and 
some States were concerned that the agencies did not adequately consult with 
them in finalizing the rule.110 While environmental groups generally supported 
the rule, some felt that the agencies could have identified additional waters 
categorically as “waters of the United States,” instead of subjecting them to a 
case-by-case “significant nexus” evaluation.111 
Within a few months after the rule was finalized, thirty one States, several 
industry and trade associations, regulated entities, and environmental groups 
 
 106. Id. at 37,059. 
 107. See Parenteau, supra note 85, at 387–88, 395–96. See also Clean Water Rule: Definition 
of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,054; EPA & Corps, Economic Analysis, supra 
note 27, at x–xi. The agencies acknowledged, though, that while the 2015 rule would reduce 
jurisdiction compared to the existing regulations and historic practice for determining jurisdiction, 
it would result in a slight increase (between 2.84% and 4.65%) in positive jurisdictional 
determinations when compared to the agencies’ recent practice, as opposed to historical practice. 
See Parenteau, supra note 85, at 387–88, 396. See also EPA & Corps, Economic Analysis, supra 
note 27, at 12. While EPA’s economic analysis projected benefits for the 2015 rule around $550 
million, a subsequent study by researchers at NYU suggested that the annual benefits of the rule 
could be as high as $1 billion. See Derrick Z. Jackson, Trump Swamp Threatens Waters of the 
United States, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS BLOG (Jan. 14, 2019, 12:33 PM), https://blog. 
ucsusa.org/derrick-jackson/trump-swamp-threatens-waters-of-the-us [https://perma.cc/E83P-8T 
BD]. 
 108. See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,054. 
 109. See Parenteau, supra note 85, at 379, citing Jenny Hopkinson, Obama’s Water War, 
POLITICO (May 27, 2015), https://politico.com/story/2015/05/epa-waterways-wetlands-rule-118 
319 [https://perma.cc/L6ZE-7ZVQ] (last visited Nov. 9, 2019). 
 110. See CRS Report, supra note 97, at 4–6. The American Farm Bureau criticized the rule as 
a “nightmare” that would reduce the value of some farms by 40%, and John Boehner, then Speaker 
of the House, called it “a tyrannical power grab that will crush jobs.” See Jackson, supra note 107. 
 111. See CRS Report, supra note 97, at 4–6. 
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brought lawsuits to challenge the rule.112 In light of ambiguity in the Clean 
Water Act regarding jurisdiction for challenging the WOTUS rule, the lawsuits 
were brought in federal district courts and in federal appellate courts.113 While 
the district court cases proceeded in several different courts, the appellate court 
challenges were consolidated in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit.114 On August 27, 2015, the day before the rule was scheduled to take 
effect, a federal district court in North Dakota issued an order that stayed the rule 
in the thirteen States that had brought the lawsuit.115 On October 9, 2015, after 
the rule had been in effect for forty–two days, the Sixth Circuit issued a 
nationwide stay of the rule.116 At that point, EPA and the Corps returned to 
enforcing the rules and guidance documents that were in force before the 2015 
rule was adopted.117 As litigation proceeded in the district courts and appellate 
courts, the National Association of Manufacturers challenged the jurisdiction of 
the appellate courts to review the rule and the Supreme Court agreed to resolve 
the jurisdictional question.118 
As challenges proceeded in the judicial arena, several bills were introduced 
in the House of Representatives, as free standing legislation or appropriations 
riders, to repeal the 2015 rule, to allow the agencies to repeal and replace the 
 
 112. See Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Pre-Existing Rules, 
82 Fed. Reg. 34,899, 34,901 (proposed July 27, 2017) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. 328). 
 113. Id. 
 114. See In re EPA & Dep’t of Def. Final Rule, 803 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2015). The Judicial 
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (“JPML”) denied the Government’s request to consolidate the 
district court challenges. See Order Denying Transfer in In re Clean Water Rule, 140 F. Supp. 3d 
1340 (U.S. Jud. Pan. Mult. Lit. 2015). 
 115. See North Dakota v. U.S. EPA, 127 F. Supp. 3d 1047 (D.N.D. 2015). The court enjoined 
enforcement of the rule in Dakota, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Missouri, 
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming. Id. The 
court concluded that the plaintiffs were likely to prevail on the merits because the agencies’ 
definition of tributary in the rule was too broad and, therefore, arbitrary and capricious and outside 
of the agencies’ statutory authority. Id. at 1055–58. In addition, the court concluded that the 
agencies’ definition of “neighboring” in the final rule was not a “logical outgrowth” of the 
definition in the proposed rule. Id. at 1058. Three years later, the court extended the scope of the 
injunction to include Iowa, which had intervened in the lawsuit. See North Dakota v. U.S. EPA, 
2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180503 (D.N.D. 2018). 
 116. See In re EPA & Dep’t of Def. Final Rule, 803 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2015), vacated by Murray 
Energy Corp. v. U.S. DOD, 713 Fed. Appx. 489 (6th Cir. 2018). In a very cursory opinion, the 
court concluded that the challengers demonstrated a substantial possibility of success on their claim 
that the rule’s “treatment of tributaries, ‘adjacent waters,’ and waters having a ‘significant nexus’ 
to navigable waters is at odds with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Rapanos” and that the distance 
limitations in the final rule were not a “logical outgrowth” of the proposed rule. Id. at 807–08. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dept. of Def., 137 S. Ct. 811 (2017). 
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rule without going through notice and comment rulemaking, or to amend the 
Clean Water Act to narrow the statutory definition of “navigable waters.”119 
While the agencies strongly defended the 2015 rule against judicial and legal 
challenges for several years, that changed abruptly after the election of President 
Trump. Less than two months after he took office, the President issued Executive 
Order 13778, entitled “Restoring the Rule of Law, Federalism, and Economic 
Growth by Reviewing the ‘Waters of the United States’ Rule.”120 While the 
President, in the Order, recognized that there is a national interest in keeping 
navigable waters free from pollution, he stressed that the goal should be 
achieved while “promoting economic growth, minimizing regulatory 
uncertainty, and showing due regard for the roles of the Congress and the States 
under the Constitution.”121 He then directed the EPA and the Corps to review 
the 2015 WOTUS rule for consistency with the policies of the Executive Order 
and to rescind or revise the rule.122 Finally, although none of the federal appellate 
courts have adopted the plurality opinion of Rapanos as the appropriate test to 
serve as the sole basis for determining jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act, 
Section 3 of the President’s Executive Order directs the agencies, when revising 
the 2015 rule, to “consider interpreting the term ‘navigable waters’ [in the Clean 
Water Act] . . . in a manner consistent with the [plurality] opinion . . . in 
Rapanos.”123 
II.  ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PRIMER: HOW TO REPEAL AND REPLACE A RULE; 
LESSONS NOT LEARNED BY THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION 
When a new President is elected, especially when the new President is a 
member of a different political party than the outgoing President, it is not 
unusual for the President to make major changes in policies and to attempt to 
revoke or replace regulations adopted by prior Administrations.124 While it is 
relatively easy, at least procedurally, to change policies adopted in Executive 
Orders or through informal procedures such as non-legislative rulemaking and 
informal adjudication, it is much more difficult to change regulations that were 
adopted through notice and comment rulemaking.125 There are significant 
 
 119. See CRS Report, supra note 97, at 9–10 (listing nine legislative proposals in the House of 
Representatives and a Senate resolution). 
 120. See Exec. Order No. 13778, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,497 (Mar. 3, 2017). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See supra note 3. 
 125. Non-legislative rules, such as interpretive rules and policy statements are exempt from the 
notice and comment rulemaking procedures of the APA, see 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2012), and 
the APA imposes few procedural limits on decisions made through informal adjudication, other 
than a requirement that agencies provide prompt notice when denying a written application, 
petition, or other request of an interested person in connection with an agency proceeding, and a 
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procedural and substantive hurdles that the new administration must overcome 
in order to rescind and replace legislative rules.  
First, when an agency has adopted a legislative rule through notice and 
comment rulemaking, it can only change that rule by adopting a new rule 
through notice and comment rulemaking.126 While the notice and comment 
procedures of the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) seem minimal when 
compared to the procedures required for formal rulemaking,127 courts have 
interpreted the notice and comment procedural requirements in ways that make 
informal rulemaking quite rigorous. For instance, the APA requires agencies to 
publish proposed rules in the Federal Register and to provide an opportunity for 
the public to comment on the rules, but the law does not explicitly set a minimum 
length for the comment period.128 Nevertheless, courts have read the statute to 
require agencies to provide a “meaningful” opportunity for comment129 and have 
struck down agency rules when the agency establishes a comment period that 
does not provide the public with an adequate opportunity to evaluate the 
proposed rule and provide comments.130 A “meaningful” opportunity to 
 
brief statement of the grounds for the denial. Id. at § 555(e). Executive Orders can be changed by 
subsequent Executive Orders. 
 126. See Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 
1993); Nat’l Fam. Plan. & Reprod. Health Ass’n v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227, 235 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
Even if the agency only plans to repeal the rule, rather than replace the rule, it must use notice and 
comment rulemaking to repeal the rule. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1044 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987); Envtl. Def. Fund v. Gorsuch, 713 F.2d 802, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (highlighting APA 
Section 551(5)’s inclusion of “repeal of a rule” as a form of rulemaking). 
 127. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 556–57 (2011). 
 128. See, e.g., North Carolina Growers Ass’n v. UFW, 702 F.3d 755, 770 (4th Cir. 2012). 
Although the APA does not set a minimum length for comment periods, Executive Order 12866 
suggests that “in most cases,” the comment period for a rule should be at least sixty days. See Exec. 
Order No. 12,866 § 6, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993). 
 129. See North Carolina Growers Ass’n, 702 F.3d at 764. See also Prometheus Radio Project 
v. F.C.C., 652 F.3d 431, 449 (3d Cir. 2011); Rural Cellular Ass’n v. FCC, 588 F.3d 1095, 1101 
(D.C. Cir. 2009). As the Third Circuit recognized, the purposes of the notice and comment 
requirements are “(1) to ensure that agency regulations are tested via exposure to diverse public 
comment, (2) to ensure fairness to affected parties, and (3) to give affected parties an opportunity 
to develop evidence in the record to support their objections to the rule and thereby enhance the 
quality of judicial review.” See Prometheus Radio Project, 652 F.3d at 449; accord Idaho Farm 
Bureau Fed’n v. Babbitt, 58 F.3d 1392, 1404 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 130. See North Carolina Growers Ass’n v. UFW, 702 F.3d at 770. In North Carolina Growers, 
the court concluded that a ten-day comment period was inadequate in light of the complexity of the 
rulemaking. Id. The court suggested that the instances in which a ten-day comment period would 
be adequate were rare. Id. In addition, the court noted that the agency received 11,000 comments 
on the rule that was being amended in the case in an earlier rulemaking after a sixty day comment 
period, while the agency only received 800 comments on the proposal being reviewed by the court 
when the agency provided a ten-day comment period. Id. 
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comment has been held to mean “enough time with enough information to 
comment” in light of the complexity of a rule.131  
In addition to requiring agencies to provide the public with a sufficiently 
long period of time to comment on a proposed rule, courts have required 
agencies, in order to provide a “meaningful” opportunity for comment, to remain 
open-minded during the comment period.132 If an agency has an “unalterably 
closed mind” during the comment period, courts have held that the agency has 
not provided the required “meaningful” opportunity for public comment.133 As 
the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has noted, 
“[c]onsideration of comments as a matter of grace is not enough.”134 
Similarly, in order to provide a “meaningful” opportunity for comment, an 
agency must provide the public with the basic data and information necessary to 
provide them with an opportunity to comment135 and may not refuse to allow 
comment on major policy issues that the agency will be considering in finalizing 
the rule.136 In North Carolina Growers Association v. United Farm Workers, 
shortly after a change in Presidential administrations, the Department of Labor 
adopted a rule to suspend rules that the agency previously adopted addressing 
the temporary admission of foreign workers to engage in agricultural jobs and 
to reinstate the rules that were in place prior to the rules that would be 
suspended.137 Although the agency allowed the public to comment on the 
agency’s decision to suspend the rules, the agency indicated that it would not 
consider comments on the merits of the rules that were being suspended or the 
rules that were being reinstated.138 The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit invalidated the agency’s suspension rule, finding that the agency 
violated the APA’s procedures when it “refused to receive comments on and to 
 
 131. See Prometheus Radio Project, 652 F.3d at 453. 
 132. See id.; Advoc. for Highway & Auto Safety v. Fed. Highway Admin., 28 F.3d 1288, 1291 
(D.C. Cir. 1994); Alaska Factory Trawler Ass’n v. Baldridge, 831 F.2d 1456, 1467 (9th Cir. 1987); 
Chocolate Mfrs. Ass’n v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098, 1103 (4th Cir. 1985); Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers, 
Inc. v. F.T.C, 627 F.2d 1151, 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
 133. See McClouth Steel Products Corp. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1317, 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1988) 
(finding that the EPA was applying a RCRA policy regarding computation of contamination levels 
as a rule and that the agency failed to provide an adequate opportunity for comment on the rule 
because the agency reacted to the comments with a closed mind); Nat’l Tour Brokers Ass’n v. U.S., 
591 F.2d 896, 902 (D.C. Cir. 1978). See also Nehemiah Corp. of Am. v. Jackson, 546 F. Supp. 2d 
830, 847 (E.D. Cal. 2008); Intl Snowmobile Mfrs Assoc v. Norton, 340 F. Supp. 2d 1249, 1261 (D. 
Wyo. 2004); Air Transp. Assn of Am. v. Hernandez, 264 F. Supp. 227, 231–32 (D.D.C. 1967). 
 134. See McClouth, 838 F.2d at 1323. 
 135. See Am. Med. Ass’n v. Reno, 57 F.3d 1129, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Portland Cement Ass’n 
v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 136. See North Carolina Growers Ass’n, 702 F.3d at 769–70. 
 137. Id. at 759–61. 
 138. Id. at 761. 
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consider or explain relevant and significant issues” in the rulemaking.139 The 
court noted that the comments that were foreclosed were “integral to the 
proposed agency action and the conditions that such action sought to 
alleviate.”140 When an agency forecloses consideration of such integral 
information, the agency is not only violating the APA procedural 
requirements,141 but the agency is acting arbitrarily and capriciously, as it is 
failing to “consider an important aspect of the problem,”142 as the Supreme 
Court recognized in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.143 
Beyond these procedural roadblocks imposed by the APA, agencies face 
substantive roadblocks when repealing or changing legislative rules. While a 
change in Presidential administration may be an appropriate reason for an 
agency to reassess its legal interpretations and policies, the change in 
administration is not a sufficient justification, in and of itself, for changes to 
those interpretations and policies.144 The Supreme Court has clearly provided 
that when an agency changes a policy, it must acknowledge that it is changing 
the policy and it must provide “good reasons” or a “reasoned analysis”145 for the 
change, or the agency’s change will be held to be arbitrary and capricious.146 As 
the Court stressed in Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, in light of the “hard 
look” arbitrary and capricious review established in State Farm, an agency must 
“articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational 
connection between the facts found and the choice made.”147 When an agency 
supports a rule with factual findings and legal conclusions, it cannot simply 
ignore those findings and conclusions when it repeals or changes the rule, but 
must explain the reasons for the changes.148 An “unexplained inconsistency” in 
 
 139. Id. at 770. 
 140. Id. at 769–70. 
 141. The North Carolina Growers Ass’n court held that the Department of Labor did not 
provide a “meaningful” opportunity for comment on the suspension rule by foreclosing comment 
on the substance of the rules that would be suspended or reinstated. See 702 F.3d at 770 (citing 
Prometheus Radio Project, 652 F.3d at 450). 
 142. See North Carolina Growers Ass’n, 702 F.3d at 769–70. 
 143. See 463 U.S. at 43. 
 144. See Buzbee, supra note 21, at 1396; Lisa Heinzerling, Laying Down the Law on Rule 
Delays, REG. REV. 2 (June 4, 2018), https://www.theregreview.org/2018/06/04/heinzerling-laying-
down-law-rule-delays/ [https://perma.cc/EU3N-BE7Y]. 
 145. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 57. 
 146. See Encino, 136 S. Ct. at 2126. The APA “requires that the pivot from one administration’s 
priorities to those of the next be accomplished with at least some fidelity to law and legal process.” 
See South Carolina Coastal Conservation League v. Pruitt, 318 F. Supp. 3d 959, 967 (D.S.C. 2018). 
 147. Encino, 136 S. Ct. at 2125 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n. of United States, Inc. v. 
State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). 
 148. Id. at 2126. The Encino Court held that “a reasoned explanation is needed for disregarding 
facts and circumstances that underlay or were engendered by the prior policy.” Id. (citing FCC v. 
Fox TV Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515–16 (2009)). As in Fox, the Court noted that the policy 
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agency policy is a reason for holding the change in policy to be arbitrary and 
capricious.149  
As Professor William Buzbee has noted, Encino, State Farm, and the 
Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA150 require that agencies “engage with 
the ‘facts and circumstances that underl[ay]’ earlier agency actions” and 
acknowledge and explain the reasons for changes in the agency’s fact-finding, 
scientific conclusions, and legal conclusions that supported the earlier actions.151 
He notes that “[a]gency policy is rarely . . . generated due to statutory language 
alone,” but also on “contingencies,” factors outside of the statutory text such as 
factual and scientific assumptions, political factors, and agency expertise, so 
agencies cannot simply reinterpret statutory language when there is a change in 
administration, but must explain why the contingencies have changed or why 
the agency is no longer motivated by the contingencies.152 Thus, he argues, in 
most cases, an agency cannot justify rescission and replacement of a rule solely 
by arguing that the agency has re-interpreted the scope of its statutory authority 
and concluded that it did not have the authority to issue the rule in the first place, 
but must also address the “contingencies” upon which the earlier rule was 
based.153 In the context of the 2015 WOTUS rule, therefore, the EPA and the 
Corps will not be able to simply “re-interpret” the scope of the agencies’ 
authority under the Clean Water Act and ignore the overwhelming body of 
scientific and economic support for the rule when repealing or replacing it. They 
 
that the agency is changing “may have ‘engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken 
into account.’” Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. See 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 151. See Buzbee, supra note 21, at 1401. 
 152. Id. at 1360–62. As Justice Kennedy wrote in Fox, “an agency’s decision to change course 
may be arbitrary and capricious if the agency ignores or countermands its earlier factual findings 
without reasoned explanation for doing so. An agency cannot simply disregard contrary or 
inconvenient factual determinations that it made in the past, any more than it can ignore 
inconvenient facts when it writes on a blank slate.” See 556 U.S. at 537 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
Professor Buzbee argues that to the extent that statutes require agencies to consider various 
scientific factors or to exercise their expertise, courts may be less willing to uphold policy changes 
that are driven by political choices, as opposed to the science or agency expertise. See Buzbee, 
supra note 21, at 1362 (citing Ronald M. Levin, Hard Look Review, Policy Change, and Fox 
Television, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 555, 565–66 (2011)); Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for 
Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 6–8 (2009). 
 153. See Buzbee, supra note 21, at 1434–35. Professor Buzbee argues that an agency will need 
to engage with the contingencies underlying a rule that is being repealed or changed when the 
agency changes its statutory interpretation upon which the rule was based and both the old and new 
interpretations are tenable. Id. However, he acknowledges that there may be rare instances where 
an agency can convince a court that there was no support for its earlier statutory interpretation and 
the court will allow the agency to repeal or change the rule that was based on the invalid statutory 
interpretation without requiring the agency to engage with the contingencies underlying the prior 
rule. Id. at 1436–37. 
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will need to engage with it and explain why the scientific and economic 
assumptions that they made four years ago are no longer valid or why the 
agencies no longer feel that those assumptions support the rule. 
In the first three years after President Trump took office, although the 
Administration aggressively pursued a de-regulatory agenda,154 environmental 
and other agencies repeatedly failed to comply with the procedural and 
substantive requirements outlined above for repealing and replacing legislative 
rules, so courts repeatedly struck down their efforts to roll back those rules.155 
While federal agencies historically have prevailed in about 70% of the cases 
brought against them alleging violations of the Administrative Procedures Act, 
federal agencies in the Trump Administration only prevailed in about 6% of the 
cases decided by March, 2019.156  
Clean Air Council v. Pruitt is an example of the trend.157 During the Obama 
Administration, EPA adopted regulations which went into effect in August 2017 
for fugitive emissions of methane and other pollutants created by the oil and 
natural gas industries.158 After the change in Administration, as the date that 
industries were required to conduct their first surveys under the regulations 
approached, EPA published a notice in the Federal Register, indicating that it 
 
 154. In the first two years after he took office, President Trump’s Administration attempted to 
repeal or replace 24 environmental rules adopted during the Obama Administration. See Marissa 
Horn, 24 Environmental Rules Trump is Rolling Back, BLOOMBERG ENV’T (Aug. 23, 2018, 7:59 
AM), https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/environment-and-energy/24-environmental-rules-
trump-is-rolling-back-1 [https://perma.cc/Y7TK-5HDW]. The Brookings Institute maintains a de-
regulatory tracker to document the broader efforts of the Trump Administration to repeal and or 
replace regulations from prior administrations. See Brookings Institution, Tracking Deregulation 
in the Trump Era (Sept. 23, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/interactives/tracking-deregulation-
in-the-trump-era/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2019). 
 155. Although this section of the Article is focusing on judicial invalidation of the 
Administration’s efforts to roll back environmental rules, the Administration has faced similar 
obstacles in court when attempting to roll back regulations outside of the environmental context. 
See, e.g., Children’s Hosp. of the King’s Daughters, Inc. v. Azar, 896 F.3d 615 (4th Cir. 2018) 
(invalidating HHS rule that changed the methodology for calculating financial assistance for 
hospitals); Nat’l Venture Cap. Ass’n v. Duke, 291 F. Supp. 3d 5 (D.D.C. 2017) (invalidating a rule 
to delay implementation of immigration regulations); Open Communities All. v. Carson, 286 F. 
Supp. 3d 148 (D.D.C. 2017) (invalidating a HUD rule to delay a prior public housing regulation); 
Pennsylvania v. Trump, 281 F. Supp. 3d 553 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (invalidating rules modifying 
Affordable Care act regulations). 
 156. See Fred Barbash & Deanna Paul, The Real Reason the Trump Administration Is 
Constantly Losing in Court, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 2019. 
 157. 862 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (holding that the Clean Air Act did not allow the EPA to 
stay implementation of several provisions of a final rule regarding methane and other greenhouse 
gases, and granting motion to vacate the stay against the EPA’s wishes). 
 158. Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources, 81 Fed. Reg. 35,824, 
35,825 (June 3, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). 
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was staying the regulations for ninety days pending reconsideration.159 Although 
the agency subsequently published a notice of proposed rulemaking to extend 
the stay for two years and to reconsider the regulations,160 the agency did not 
use notice and comment rulemaking to stay the regulations for the initial ninety 
days. In response to challenges by several environmental groups, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit struck down the stay of the regulations, 
dismissing the agency’s assertion that it had inherent authority to briefly stay 
regulations without going through notice and comment rulemaking while it 
reconsidered them161 and rejecting the agency’s claim that the language of the 
Clean Air Act authorized the agency to stay the regulations pending 
reconsideration without going through notice and comment rulemaking.162  
A year later, in Air Alliance Houston v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit struck down 
another EPA rule that was designed to repeal and replace an Obama 
Administration Clean Air Act regulation.163 On January 13, 2017, EPA adopted 
regulations to prevent the accidental release and to minimize the consequences 
of release of various hazardous substances (the “Chemical Disaster Rule”).164 
After the change in administration, EPA issued a rule to delay the effective date 
of the accidental release regulations for almost two years, pending the agency’s 
reconsideration of the rule.165 Although the agency used notice and comment 
rulemaking to adopt the rule that delayed the accidental release regulations, the 
Clean Air Act only authorized the agency to stay such regulations pending 
reconsideration for ninety days.166 When community groups, environmental 
groups, and states challenged the agency’s action, the court invalidated the delay 
rule, finding that the agency lacked statutory authority to stay the rule beyond 
ninety days.167 The court also held that EPA’s promulgation of the delay rule 
 
 159. Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources; Grant of 
Reconsideration and Partial Stay, 82 Fed. Reg. 25,730, 25,730–31 (June 5, 2017). 
 160. See Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources; Stay of Certain 
Requirements, 82 Fed. Reg. 27,645 (proposed June 16, 2017) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). 
 161. The court stressed that “it is ‘axiomatic’ that ‘administrative agencies may act only 
pursuant to authority delegated to them by Congress.’” Clean Air Council, 862 F.3d at 8 (quoting 
Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 632 (D.C. Cir. 2014)). 
 162. Clean Air Council, 862 F.3d at 9–10. The Court noted that section 307(d)(7)(B) of the 
Clean Air Act authorized EPA to stay rules, but only when a petitioner presented an objection of 
“central relevance” that was “impracticable” to raise during the public comment period, and the 
court concluded that those pre-requisites were not met in the case. Id. 
 163. 906 F.3d 1049, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 2018). Justice Kavanaugh was a member of the panel when 
the case was argued, but did not participate in the decision. Id. at 1052. 
 164. See Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under the 
Clean Air Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 4594 (Jan. 13, 2017) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 68). 
 165. See Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under the 
Clean Air Act; Further Delay of Effective Date, 82 Fed. Reg. 27,133 (June 14, 2017) (to be codified 
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 68). 
 166. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(7)(B) (2012). 
 167. Air All. Houston, 906 F.3d at 1060–61. 
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was arbitrary and capricious because the agency didn’t adequately explain its 
change in position, as required by Encino, Fox, and State Farm.168 Specifically, 
the court noted that EPA failed to explain “its departure from [the agency’s] 
previous conclusions regarding the appropriate and practicable timeline for 
implementing the Chemical Disaster Rule” and failed to “explain why the 
detailed factual findings . . . [supporting the Chemical Disaster Rule were] now 
only ‘speculative.’”169 
The Second Circuit also struck down an effort by a different agency to roll 
back environmental protections in Natural Resources Defense Council v. 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.170 On December 28, 2016, the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) issued a final rule 
to increase the civil penalties for violations of the corporate average fuel 
economy (“CAFE”) standards.171 On July 12, 2017, after the change in 
Administration, NHTSA issued a final rule, without providing notice or an 
opportunity for comment on a proposed rule, to delay the December 2016 civil 
penalty rule “indefinitely” pending reconsideration.172 The Second Circuit held 
that the statute pursuant to which NHTSA acted did not authorize the agency to 
indefinitely delay the civil penalty regulations.173 The court also found that 
NHTSA violated the APA in issuing its final rule, because the agency did not 
provide notice and an opportunity for comment on a proposed rule and because 
the agency’s rule did not fit within the APA’s “good cause” exemption from the 
notice and comment procedural requirements.174  
Attempts to roll back environmental regulations have also been invalidated 
at the federal district court level. For instance, in California v. U.S. Bureau of 
Land Management, the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
California struck down a rule issued by the Department of Interior (“DOI”), 
without going through notice and comment procedures, that would postpone the 
compliance deadlines for regulations that had gone into effect during the Obama 
Administration to regulate venting and flaring of natural gas, and royalties from 
those activities.175 DOI argued that Section 705 of the APA authorized the 
agency to postpone the regulations’ compliance deadlines, as it authorizes 
agencies, “when [they find] that justice so requires, [to] postpone the effective 
 
 168. Id. at 1066. 
 169. Id. at 1067 (citing Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management 
Programs Under the Clean Air Act; Further Delay of Effective Date, 82 Fed. Reg. at 27,139). 
 170. 894 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir. 2018). 
 171. NHTSA Civil Penalties, 81 Fed. Reg. 95,489 (Dec. 28, 2016) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. 
pt. 578). 
 172. NHTSA Civil Penalties, 82 Fed. Reg. 32,139 (July 12, 2017) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. 
pt. 578). 
 173. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 894 F.3d at 108. 
 174. Id. at 113–15. 
 175. 277 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 1111–12 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
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date of action taken by [them], pending judicial review.”176 The court, however, 
held that while Section 705 authorizes the delay of the effective date of a 
regulation that is not yet in effect, it does not authorize the delay of the 
compliance date of a regulation.177 The court also held that the indefinite 
postponement of the compliance dates in the prior regulation was tantamount to 
the repeal of that regulation, which could not be done without following notice 
and comment procedures.178 The court’s decision was widely expected, because 
the same court issued an almost identical ruling against DOI in the prior year, in 
Becerra v. United States DOI.179  
These cases demonstrate a pattern of arrogance or simply indifference to the 
procedural and substantive requirements of the APA that apply to the repeal and 
replacement of legislative rules. As will be examined in Parts V through VII of 
this Article, that pattern continues with the Administration’s efforts to repeal and 
replace the 2015 WOTUS rule.  
III.  EPA AND THE CORPS’ EFFORTS TO RESCIND AND REPLACE THE 2015 
WOTUS RULE 
EPA and the Corps began their efforts to rescind and replace their 2015 rule 
shortly after President Trump issued Executive Order 13778 directing them to 
take those actions. Instead of moving ahead with a proposed rule to amend the 
definition of “waters of the United States” in the manner suggested by the 
Executive Order, though, the agencies decided to amend the rule through a two-
step process. As a first step, the agencies planned to adopt a regulation that 
would rescind the 2015 regulation and would re-codify the regulatory definition 
of “waters of the United States” that existed prior to the adoption of the 2015 
regulation.180 Those regulations, and the agencies’ guidance interpreting those 
regulations, were being implemented in most of the country at the time because 
the Sixth Circuit had issued a nationwide stay of the 2015 rule.181 However, the 
agencies realized that the nationwide stay might be lifted if the Supreme Court, 
 
 176. Id. at 1117–18 (emphasis added) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 705 (2012)). 
 177. Id. at 1118. 
 178. Id. at 1121. 
 179. See 276 F. Supp. 3d 953, 964–65 (N.D. Cal. 2017). In another case, Pineros y Campesinos 
Unidos v. Pruitt, the District Court for the Northern District of California invalidated EPA’s efforts, 
without going through notice and comment rulemaking, to delay the effective date of regulations 
addressing the certification and use of “restricted use pesticides.” 293 F. Supp. 3d 1062, 1062–64, 
1066–67 (N.D. Cal. 2018). The court rejected EPA’s claim that the agency could finalize its delay 
rule by relying on the “good cause” exception to the notice and comment requirements. Id. at 1066–
67. 
 180. Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Pre-Existing Rules, 82 
Fed. Reg. 34,899 (proposed July 27, 2017) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328). 
 181. See supra note 116 and accompanying text; In re EPA & Dep’t of Def. Final Rule, 803 
F.3d 804, 807–08 (6th Cir. 2015), vacated, 713 F. App’x. 489 (6th Cir. 2018). 
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in the case before it at the time, ultimately concluded that the federal appellate 
courts lacked jurisdiction to hear the initial challenges to the 2015 rule. The 
agencies likely anticipated that the Step One (“repeal”) rulemaking would ensure 
that the pre-2015 regulations would be implemented during the time that it 
would take to develop a rule consistent with the Executive Order. As the second 
step of the agencies’ two-step process, the agencies planned to adopt a regulation 
that would replace the pre-2015 regulations and define “waters of the United 
States” in a manner consistent with Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in 
Rapanos.182 
The agencies published a notice of proposed rulemaking for the “Step One” 
rule on July 27, 2017 and were, once again, flooded with comments.183 It soon 
became apparent that the agencies would not be able to finalize the Step One 
rule to rescind the 2015 rule before the Supreme Court reached a decision that 
could trigger a vacation of the Sixth Circuit stay and reinstatement of the 2015 
rule. As a result, on November 22, 2017, the agencies issued a notice of proposed 
rulemaking to add an “applicability date” to the 2015 rule that would delay 
implementation of the rule for two additional years.184 In less than 3 months, on 
February 6, 2018, the agencies finalized that rule (“the suspension rule” or 
“applicability date” rule), which provided that the 2015 rule would not be 
applicable until February 6, 2020.185  
As the agencies anticipated, the Supreme Court reached a decision regarding 
the jurisdictional question before the Step One rule was finalized. On January 
22, 2018, in National Association of Manufacturers v. Department of Defense, 
the Court held that challenges to the agencies’ regulations defining “waters of 
the United States” should be brought in federal district court.186 Consequently, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated its nationwide 
stay of the 2015 rule and dismissed all of the consolidated circuit court 
challenges to the rule.187 Although the Sixth Circuit vacated its stay of the 2015 
rule, the agencies’ applicability date rule prevented the 2015 rule from being 
implemented at that time.  
 
 182. Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Pre-Existing Rules, 82 
Fed. Reg. at 34,902. 
 183. See Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Pre-Existing Rules, 
82 Fed. Reg. at 34,899. The agencies received more than 780,000 comments on the proposal. 
Waters of the United States—Reinstatement of Preexisting Rules, EPA Docket # 
EPA-HQ-OW-2017-0203, ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D=EPA-H 
Q-OW-2017-0203 [https://perma.cc/ESZ9-APF7]. 
 184. Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Addition of an Applicability Date to 2015 
Clean Water Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 55,542 (proposed Nov. 22, 2017) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 
328). 
 185. Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Addition of an Applicability Date to 2015 
Clean Water Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 5200 (Feb. 6, 2018) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328). 
 186. 138 S. Ct. 617, 621 (2018). 
 187. See In re EPA & Dep’t of Def. Final Rule, 713 F. App’x 489, 490–91 (6th Cir. 2018). 
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After the Supreme Court issued its ruling, several lawsuits challenging the 
2015 rule that had been stayed pending the outcome of the Supreme Court’s 
resolution of the jurisdictional issue moved forward.188 The United States had 
no interest in defending the 2015 rule on the merits in those lawsuits, so the 
government urged the courts to continue to stay the litigation because the 
applicability date rule prevented enforcement of the 2015 rule until 2020, by 
which time the agencies would have adopted new rules to replace the 2015 rule, 
so the challenges would be moot.189 Most courts rejected the government’s pleas 
and continued the lawsuits, although the government did little to defend the rule 
on the merits.190 Federal district courts in Georgia and Texas eventually stayed 
the enforcement of the 2015 rule in fourteen states.191  
 
 188. See, e.g., Order at 3, North Dakota v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, No. 3:15-cv-59 (D.N.D. 
Mar. 23, 2015), ECF No. 185; Order, Georgia v. Pruitt, No. 2:15-cv-79 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 2015), 
ECF No. 144. 
 189. See Order, North Dakota v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, supra note 188, at 10–11; Order, 
Georgia v. Pruitt, supra note 188. 
 190. See Order, North Dakota v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, supra note 188, at 15–16; Order, 
Georgia v. Pruitt, supra note 188. While many of the district court challenges proceeded after the 
Supreme Court’s decision, two cases in Oklahoma were “administratively closed” at EPA’s 
request, while the agencies continued their rulemaking efforts. See Administrative Closing Order 
at 2–3, Oklahoma v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, No. 4:15-cv-381 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 9, 2018), ECF 
No. 56; Administrative Closing Order, Chamber of Commerce of the U.S.A. v. U.S. Env’t Prot. 
Agency, No. 4:15-cv-386 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 9, 2018), ECF No. 64. As EPA refused to defend the 
2015 rule on the merits in litigation, intervenors have stepped in to defend the rule. See Steven M. 
Sellers, Environmental Groups Get Nod to Enter EPA Clean Water Suit, BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 4, 
2019, 11:01 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/product-liability-and-toxics-law/environmental 
-groups-get-nod-to-enter-epa-clean-water-suit [https://perma.cc/A4L4-AQQL]. NRDC and the 
National Wildlife Federation are defending the rule in Ohio v. EPA, litigation proceeding in the 
Southern District of Ohio. Id. 
 191. See Georgia v. Pruitt, 326 F. Supp. 3d, 1356, 1370 (S.D. Ga. 2018); Texas v. U.S. Env’t 
Prot. Agency, No. 3:15-CV-00162, 2018 WL 4518230, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2018). The district 
court in Texas rejected the plaintiffs’ request for a nationwide injunction and stayed enforcement 
of the rule in Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi. Texas v. U.S. EPA, 2018 WL 4518230, at *1–2. 
The court did not directly address the merits of the plaintiffs’ challenges but reasoned that, “[w]ere 
the Court not to temporarily enjoin the Rule now, it risks asking the states, their governmental 
subdivisions, and their citizens to expend valuable resources and time operationalizing a rule that 
may not survive judicial review.” Id. at *1. The district court in Georgia enjoined enforcement of 
the rule in Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Georgia v. Pruitt, 326 F. Supp. 3d at 1370. That court 
concluded that the plaintiffs’ were likely to prevail on their claims that the 2015 rule violated the 
APA procedures and was arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 1365. The United States was forced with 
a difficult choice when defending the rule in those cases, regarding the remedy. See Amanda Reilly 
& Ariel Wittenberg, Supreme Court Ruling Complicates Next Steps on WOTUS, E&E NEWS (Jan. 
22, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060071583 [https://perma.cc/8678-V8KB]. 
Historically, the federal government has strongly contested the authority of federal district courts 
to issue nationwide injunctions. See Parenteau, supra note 85, at 403. However, the government 
wanted the 2015 rule to be struck down nationwide and the Supreme Court’s decision funneled 
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While the lawsuits challenging the 2015 rule moved ahead, environmental 
groups and States brought lawsuits to challenge the agencies’ applicability date 
rule.192 On August 16, 2018, the United States District Court for the District of 
South Carolina struck down the applicability date rule and issued a nationwide 
injunction against enforcement of the rule.193 As a result, after that date, the 2015 
rule was in force in twenty-two states, while the pre-2015 rules were in force in 
the twenty-eight states that were covered by the injunctions issued in North 
Dakota, Georgia, and Texas.194  
The agencies’ quest to repeal and replace the 2015 rule continued on 
February 14, 2019, when EPA and the Corps published a notice of proposed 
rulemaking for the Step Two (“replacement”) rule that would adopt the Rapanos 
plurality definition of “waters of the United States.”195 For those keeping score 
at home, that means that the agencies proposed or adopted three rules to repeal 
or replace the 2015 rule or to prevent it from being implemented. In each of 
those three rulemakings, though, the agencies ignored the lessons that the 
Administration should have learned from the plethora of failed rulemakings 
outlined in the preceding section, and the agencies failed to comply with the 
basic procedural and substantive requirements that must be followed when 
agencies repeal or replace regulations. The next sections of this Article explore 
the fundamental errors that the agencies made in the Step One rulemaking, 
Applicability Date rulemaking, and Step Two rulemaking.  
IV.  FLAWS IN THE STEP ONE (“REPEAL”) RULEMAKING 
A. The Initial Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
EPA and the Corps published their notice of proposed rulemaking for the 
Step One rule to repeal the 2015 rule and replace it with the pre-2015 regulations 
on July 27, 2017.196 The agencies indicated that the purpose of the rulemaking 
was to provide consistency, clarity, and continuity.197 While the agencies had 
adopted the 2015 rule to provide predictability, clarity and consistency, the Sixth 
 
challenges to the rule to the federal district courts. Despite their interest in uniformity and a 
nationwide return to the pre-2015 rules, the agencies opposed requests in the district courts to enjoin 
the rule on a nationwide basis. For an interesting examination of nationwide injunctions, see Samuel 
L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. 417 (2017). 
 192. See infra notes 260–268 and accompanying text. 
 193. S.C. Coastal Conservation League v. Pruitt, 318 F. Supp. 3d 959, 969–70 (D. S.C. 2018). 
 194. On July 26, 2019, the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon enjoined the 
enforcement of the 2015 rule in Oregon, as well. See Order, Or. Cattlemens Assn. v. U.S. Env’t 
Prot. Agency, No. 3:19-cv-00564-AC (D. Or. July 26, 2019), ECF No. 58. 
 195. Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg. 4154, 4154–55 
(proposed Feb. 14, 2019) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328). 
 196. See supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
 197. Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Pre-Existing Rules, 82 
Fed. Reg. 34,899, 34,902 (proposed July 27, 2017) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. 328). 
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Circuit nationwide stay of the 2015 rule was in place at the time the agencies 
issued their Step One proposal, so the agencies were enforcing the pre-2015 
regulations. If, however, the Supreme Court concluded, as it ultimately did, that 
the Sixth Circuit did not have authority to hear challenges to the 2015 rule and 
stay the rule, the agencies were concerned that, after the stay was lifted, the 2015 
rule would be enforced in parts of the country, while the pre-2015 regulations 
would be enforced in other parts of the country, and it might be unclear which 
rules applied in which parts of the country.198 The agencies argued that their 
proposal to reinstate the pre-2015 regulations nationwide would avoid that 
fractured scenario, thus promoting consistency, clarity and continuity.199  
While the agencies, in the 2015 rule, stressed the centrality of the objectives 
of Section 101(a), the agencies in the Step One proposal stressed, instead, the 
policy of Section 101(b) of the Clean Water Act to “recognize, preserve, and 
protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and 
eliminate pollution, to plan the development and use (including restoration, 
preservation, and enhancement) of land and water resources.”200 While the 
agencies, in the 2015 rule, stressed the important role that science plays in 
determining which waters should be regulated to meet the objectives of Section 
101(a), the agencies in the Step One proposal stressed that the “significant 
nexus” determination “is not a purely scientific determination” and that the 
determination of what waters should be regulated should be guided by the 
objectives and goals of the Clean Water Act, including Section 101(b).201 
Consequently, they spent very little time addressing the science supporting the 
2015 rule in their Step One proposal. 
While the agencies, in the 2015 rule, forecast that the economic benefits of 
the rule would clearly exceed the costs of the rule, the agencies, in the Step One 
rulemaking proposal, only two years later, determined that the costs that would 
be avoided by repealing the 2015 rule and returning to the pre-2015 regulatory 
regime, were between four and seven times as high as the benefits that would be 
lost by repealing the 2015 rule.202  
The agencies set an initial comment period of thirty days, but the agencies 
limited the scope of the comments that they were willing to accept.203 
Specifically, the agencies indicated that they were soliciting comments “as to 
whether it is desirable and appropriate to re-codify in regulation the status quo 
 
 198. Id. at 34,902–03. 
 199. Id. at 34,903. 
 200. Id. at 34,900. 
 201. Id. at 34,902. 
 202. Economic Analysis for the Proposed Definition of “Waters of the United States”—
Recodification of Pre-existing Rules, U. S. ENVTL PROT. AGENCY, 8–12 (June 2017), 
https://www.eenews.net/assets/2017/07/07/document_gw_04.pdf [https://perma.cc/KTE2-98RG]. 
 203. Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Pre-Existing Rules, 82 
Fed. Reg. at 34,899, 34,903 (proposed July 27, 2017) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. 328). 
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as an interim first step pending a substantive rulemaking to reconsider the 
definition of ‘waters of the United States’” and that they would not consider 
comments addressing the pre-2015 regulatory definition of “waters of the United 
States” or any future changes to the definition of “waters of the United 
States.”204  
1. Flaws in the Initial Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
If the agencies had finalized the Step One rule as proposed, based on the 
justifications in the notice of proposed rulemaking, the rule would very likely 
have been quickly invalidated.205 First, the agencies’ refusal to allow 
commenters to address the pre-2015 regulatory regime or any future changes to 
the definition of “waters of the United States” to replace the 2015 rule was 
precisely the type of action that the North Carolina Growers Association court 
held was “arbitrary and capricious” and deprived the public of their “opportunity 
to comment” under the APA.206 Similarly, the agencies’ limit on comments, 
coupled with the tone of the rulemaking, suggested that the agencies were 
proceeding with an “unalterably closed mind,” foreclosing the public’s 
opportunity for meaningful comment on the rule.207 In addition, as in the Air 
Alliance Houston case, the agencies ignored the mandates of Encino, Fox, and 
State Farm and failed to adequately address the reasons that they were 
abandoning the vast body of scientific, factual, and legal justifications for the 
2015 rule that they relied on just two years earlier.208 Finally, as many have 
noted, the agencies’ re-evaluation of the economic costs and benefits of the 2015 
rule appeared arbitrary and capricious.209 The change in the agencies’ 
calculation of the costs and benefits for the 2015 rule and for the repeal of the 
2015 rule was driven primarily by the fact that the agencies significantly reduced 
their calculation of the economic benefits associated with wetlands conservation 
in the Step One rulemaking.210 The agencies reduced their calculation because 
 
 204. Id. at 34,903. 
 205. See Parenteau, supra note 85, at 382. 
 206. See supra notes 137–143 and accompanying text. 
 207. See supra notes 132–134 and accompanying text. 
 208. See supra notes 163–169 and accompanying text. See also Parenteau, supra note 85, at 
382. As Professor Parenteau notes, neither the data used to support the 2015 rule nor the caselaw 
supporting the 2015 rule nor the economic benefits of the 2015 changed in the two years between 
the adoption of the 2015 rule and the agencies’ proposed repeal. Id. at 406. The only justification 
provided by the agencies for their change in position is that the 2015 rulemaking did not include 
enough discussion of the importance of Section 101(b) of the Clean Water Act in determining 
jurisdiction under the Act. Id. 
 209. Id. at 396–97. See also McCarthy, et al., supra note 11, at 10,769; James Goodwin, 
Practitioner Insights: Fuzzy Math to Assault Environmental Rules, 48 ENV’T. REP. 1559, 1560 
(Sept. 29, 2017). 
 210. See Parenteau, supra note 85, at 396. Those benefits accounted for almost 90% of the total 
economic benefits of the 2015 rule. See Goodwin, supra note 209, at 1559–61. 
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they argued that the calculation used to support the 2015 rule was based on 
outdated contingent valuation studies.211 However, in other areas of the Step 
One economic analysis, the agencies relied on studies of similar vintage, and 
critics argued that more recent studies of public attitude toward wetlands 
conservation would likely generate even greater economic benefits for 
conservation than found in the studies that were excluded.212 
While there were significant procedural and substantive flaws in the 
agencies’ original Step One rulemaking proposal, the agencies did not finalize 
the proposal based solely on the original notice.  
B. The Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
After EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt resigned,213 the agencies attempted to 
cure some of the flaws of the initial notice of proposed rulemaking by issuing a 
supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking for the Step One rule and providing 
 
 211. See Parenteau, supra note 85, at 396–97; McCarthy, et al., supra note 11, at 10,777; 
Goodwin, supra note 209, at 1559–61. The contingent valuation studies focus on the amount of 
money persons were “willing to pay” to protect an acre of wetlands. See Goodwin, supra note 209, 
at 1560. By eliminating those studies, and suggesting that the agencies could not place a value on 
those benefits, the agencies eliminated almost all of the expected benefits of the 2015 rule. Id. See 
also Parenteau, supra note 85, at 396. 
 212. See McCarthy, et al., supra note 11, at 10,777; Parenteau, supra note 85, at 396–397. 
Goodwin and Parenteau both note that studies would likely show that the public places a higher 
value on conserving wetlands today than they did at the time of the outdated studies, suggesting 
that the contingent valuation studies underestimated, if anything, the true benefits of the 2015 rule. 
See Goodwin, supra note 209 at 1561; Parenteau, supra note 85, at 397. Critics have also argued 
that the agencies inappropriately used the 1986 regulation landscape, rather than the 2015 rule, as 
the baseline for the economic analysis of the Step One repeal rule. See McCarthy, et al., supra note 
11, at 10,769; Parenteau, supra note 85, at 397. Although the 2015 rule was stayed at the time the 
agencies issued the notice of proposed rulemaking for the Step One rule, the lifting of the stay was 
imminent and arrived before the Step One rule was finalized. In addition to those criticisms, 
Professor Parenteau notes that the Institute for Policy Integrity at New York University also 
criticized the agencies because their economic analysis assumed that states would protect wetlands 
that were left unprotected by repeal of the 2015 rule, which was an erroneous assumption because 
twenty-four states, including states containing the largest areas of wetlands to be left unprotected 
by the repeal rule, do not provide any additional protection for wetlands that are not protected by 
the federal government. Parenteau, supra note 85, at 397. 
 213. See Coral Davenport et al., E.P.A. Chief Scott Pruitt Resigns Under a Cloud of Ethics 
Scandals, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/05/climate/scott-pruitt-
epa-trump.html [https://perma.cc/EYJ8-YDSR]; Brady Dennis & Juliet Eilperin, Scott Pruitt Steps 
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a thirty day comment period for the supplemental notice.214 The agencies 
addressed the North Carolina Growers Association problem raised by their 
initial proposal by broadening the scope of comments solicited to include the 
merits of the 2015 rule and pre-2015 regulations.215 As in the initial notice, the 
agencies re-asserted that the proposed action was necessary to provide 
regulatory certainty for States, regulated entities, and the public, as challenges 
to the 2015 rule created uncertainty regarding the scope of Clean Water Act 
jurisdiction.216 
The agencies also attempted to justify their decision to repeal the 2015 rule 
by advancing several criticisms to the rule based on their reinterpretation of the 
statute and case law supporting the 2015 rule.217 Throughout the supplemental 
notice, the agencies repeatedly asserted that the 2015 rule was flawed because 
the agencies, in that rule, relied too heavily on science, rather than law, to 
determine the scope of waters regulated under Justice Kennedy’s “significant 
nexus” test.218 Further, the agencies argued, in the supplemental notice, that the 
2015 rule inappropriately altered the balance between federal and State 
governments in contravention of Section 101(b) of the Clean Water Act.219 
Based on a narrower reading of Justice Kennedy’s Rapanos opinion than the 
agencies adopted in the past, the agencies also argued, in the supplemental 
notice, that the 2015 rule inappropriately expanded the definitions of 
“tributaries” and “adjacent wetlands” to include waters that lack a “significant 
nexus” to jurisdictional waters and inappropriately defined the “region” to be 
evaluated when considering whether a water has a “significant nexus” to a 
traditional navigable water.220  
 
 214. See Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Preexisting Rule, 83 
Fed. Reg. 32,227, 32,227 (proposed July 12, 2018) (to be codified 33 C.F.R. pt. 328). The agencies 
ultimately received over 100,000 comments on the supplemental notice. Id at 32,230. 
 215. Id. at 32,231. 
 216. Id. at 32,228. The agencies claimed that the substantial experience that they had in 
administering the pre-2015 regulations would advance regulatory certainty. Id. 
 217. Id. The agencies suggested that “[a]t a minimum, . . . the interpretation of the statute 
adopted in the 2015 rule is not compelled and raises significant legal questions.” Id. 
 218. Id. at 32,240–41. 
 219. Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Preexisting Rule, 83 Fed. 
Reg. 32,227, 32,228 (proposed July 12, 2018) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328). In the Step One 
rulemaking, the agencies continue to rely on the Kennedy “significant nexus” test as the basis for 
determining jurisdiction over “waters of the United States,” rather than the Rapanos plurality test. 
 220. Id. at 32,228–29. (In describing the “significant nexus” test in his concurring opinion in 
Rapanos, Justice Kennedy wrote that “[A] water has a significant nexus when any single function 
or combination of functions performed by the water, alone or together with similarly situated waters 
in the region, contributes significantly to the chemical, physical, or biological integrity of the 
nearest . . . [primary] water.”) Id. at 32,240; See also Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 780 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). The agencies argued, in their supplemental rulemaking, that they interpreted Justice 
Kennedy’s language too broadly in the 2015 rule when they defined “region” to encompass a 
“watershed” and when they focused, in the 2015 rule, on the contribution of all of the waters in the 
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1. Flaws in the Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
While the agencies’ supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking may have 
reduced, or eliminated, challenges to a final Step One rule based on failure of 
the agencies to provide the public with an opportunity to comment, there are still 
significant flaws in the rulemaking.221 The agencies’ supplemental notice did 
not modify the economic analysis that was prepared for the initial notice of 
proposed rulemaking, so the agencies’ re-evaluation of the costs and benefits of 
the 2015 rule in the Step One rule is still likely arbitrary and capricious.222 In 
 
watershed, rather than simply the wetlands in the watershed. See Definition of “Waters of the United 
States”—Recodification of Preexisting Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 32,227, 32,240 (proposed July 12, 2018) 
(to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328). In addition to the concerns outlined above, the agencies, in the 
supplemental notice, expressed concern that “many features that are categorically jurisdictional 
under the 2015 rule . . . test the limits of the scope of the Commerce Clause because they may not 
have the requisite effect on the channels of interstate commerce.” Id. at 32,249. 
 221. EPA and the Corps finalized the Step One rulemaking in September 2019. See Lisa 
Friedman & Coral Davenport, Trump Administration Rolls Back Clean Water Protections, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/12/climate/trump-administration-rolls-
back-clean-water-protections.html [https://perma.cc/NKZ6-TP49] A pre-publication version of the 
rule is available in Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Preexisting Rules, 
84 Fed. Reg. 56,626, 56,626 (Oct. 22, 2019) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328). In the final rule, 
the agencies relied heavily on many of the justifications that they set forth in the supplemental 
notice of proposed rulemaking. Specifically, the agencies argued that it was necessary to repeal the 
2015 rule because the agencies (1) did not believe that the rule was authorized by the statute, in 
light of their reinterpretation of the statute and the Riverside Bayview, SWANCC, and Rapanos 
precedents; (2) felt that the 2015 rule did not adequately accord weight to the policies of Section 
101(b) of the Clean Water Act; (3) were concerned that the rule could be unconstitutional and 
beyond statutory authority to the extent that it interferes with traditional state authority over land 
use; and (4) believed that there were procedural errors in the rulemaking and that a portion of the 
rule was not supported by an adequate record. Id. at 56,627, 56,629, 56,639. In addition, they 
repeated their assertion that regulatory certainty would be best served by repealing the 2015 rule 
and reinstating the pre-2015 regulatory regime. Id. at 56,659. Further, the Step One rule was 
challenged by several environmental groups in the U.S. District Court for South Carolina on 
October 23, 2019 and was challenged by fourteen states, the District of Columbia, and the City of 
New York in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York on December 19, 2019. 
See South Carolina Coastal Conservation League v. Wheeler, No. 2:19-cv-03006, 2019 U.S. Dist. 
(D.S.C. Oct. 23, 2019); New York v. Wheeler, No. 19-11673, 2019 U.S. Dist. (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 
2019). 
 222. See supra notes 209–212 and accompanying text. When the agencies finalized the Step 
One rule, they modified the economic analysis that they prepared for the Step One rule and the 
economic analysis that was prepared for the 2015 rule. See Definition of “Waters of the United 
States”—Recodification of Preexisting Rules, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56,662. However, they did not cure 
the deficiencies in the wetland valuation studies noted above. See supra notes 209–212 and 
accompanying text. The agencies dismiss any concerns that are raised over the legitimacy of their 
economic analyses, though, by arguing that the analyses are provided for information purposes 
only, as the agencies must repeal the 2015 rule because it is beyond their statutory authority. See 
Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Preexisting Rules, 84 Fed. Reg. at 
56,663. 
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addition, the criticisms that the agencies made to the 2015 definitions of 
“region,” “tributaries,” and “adjacent waters” are based on a flawed reading of 
Justice Kennedy’s Rapanos concurrence.223 Since the agencies are relying on 
those flawed interpretations and a claim that the repeal of the 2015 rule is 
necessary to ensure regulatory certainty, which is not true, the agencies have not 
provided a reasonable explanation for their decision to repeal the 2015 rule.224 
Finally, in the supplemental notice, the agencies failed to adequately and 
reasonably address the reasons that they were abandoning the vast body of 
scientific evidence that supported the 2015 rule, arguing, instead, that the 
determination of a “significant nexus” should not be based on science, but on 
law and policy.  
a. Regulatory Certainty 
The agencies suggested, in the supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking, 
that the 2015 rule should be repealed and replaced with the pre-2015 regulatory 
framework because there have been several lawsuits filed challenging the 2015 
rule and there could be confusion created if some of those lawsuits invalidate 
 
 223. The agencies argued, in the supplemental notice, that it was inappropriate for them to 
define the “region” to be examined when determining whether a water has a “significant nexus” to 
jurisdictional waters to include all of the similarly situated waters, rather than just wetlands, in the 
watershed. See 83 Fed. Reg. at 32,240. However, the agencies noted, in the 2015 rule, that nothing 
in Justice Kennedy’s opinion suggested that the “significant nexus” determination should only 
focus on wetlands in a region, rather than waters in a region, and that the determination should 
focus on evaluating impacts of waters in light of the goals and purposes of Section 101(a) of the 
Clean Water Act. See 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,061, 37,066. The agencies criticized the 2015 definition 
of “tributary,” in their supplemental notice, on the grounds that the definition failed to consider 
volume, duration, and frequency of flow of water in a tributary, which made it possible to regulate 
small waters that may lack a “significant nexus” to jurisdictional waters. See Definition of “Waters 
of the United States”—Recodification of Preexisting Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. at 32,241 (proposed July 
12, 2018) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328). However, the 2015 rule defined tributary more 
narrowly than prior regulations (as Justice Kennedy suggested might be necessary), by requiring a 
bed and banks and additional indicators of an ordinary high water mark, to limit the term to waters 
where the agencies determined the science suggested that the volume, frequency, and flow was 
sufficient to provide a “significant nexus” to jurisdictional waters. See 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,058. 
Finally, the agencies, in their supplemental rulemaking notice, argued that it was inappropriate to 
regulate “adjacent waters” in the 2015 rule because the waters could be adjacent to very small 
tributaries, since the term “tributary” did not consider volume, duration, and frequency of flow of 
water. See Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Preexisting Rule, 83 Fed. 
Reg. at 32,241. However, because the 2015 definition of “tributary” limits jurisdiction to waters 
with sufficient volume, frequency, and flow, see id. at 32,240–41, the concerns that the agencies 
raised in the supplemental notice are unfounded. 
 224. The arguments that the agencies made in the step One rulemaking regarding section 101(b) 
and the appropriate role of the federal and state governments in defining jurisdiction under the 
Clean Water Act are similar to the arguments that they made when they proposed the Step Two 
rule. Instead of addressing the flaws in those arguments here, they will be addressed in part VII of 
this Article. 
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portions of the rule while other lawsuits uphold the rule.225 However, most of 
EPA’s “economically significant” rules are challenged in court.226 Taken to its 
logical end, the agencies’ argument in support of repealing the 2015 rule would 
suggest that agencies should almost never adopt rules, since they are likely to be 
challenged so frequently. When Congress enacts statutes that require challenges 
to agency rules to be brought in federal district courts, as is the case with the 
“waters of the United States” rule,227 it is inevitable that there will be conflicting 
interpretations of the rule adopted by district courts and that there could be some 
confusion regarding the appropriate interpretation of the statute until the 
conflicting decisions are harmonized on appeal, ultimately in the Supreme 
Court, if necessary. The fact that a rule must be challenged in federal district 
courts that may reach contradictory interpretations of a statute is not, however, 
a reason for an agency to refrain from rulemaking.  
In addition, while the agencies argued, in the supplemental notice, that they 
must repeal the 2015 rule to avoid the confusion that would be created by 
conflicting judicial opinions regarding the validity of the 2015 rule, the agencies 
would create precisely the same potentially confusing scenario by repealing the 
2015 rule and reinstating the pre-2015 regulatory framework, as the repeal rule 
would likely be challenged in a variety of federal district courts that may issue 
conflicting decisions regarding whether the repeal is valid.228 That would create 
precisely the same confusion that the agencies claimed they were attempting to 
avoid by repealing the 2015 rule. Consequently, the agencies’ attempt to repeal 
the 2015 rule will not reduce the confusion or increase consistency or uniformity 
of the interpretation of the Clean Water Act in any way.  
 
 225. See Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Preexisting Rule, 83 
Fed. Reg. at 32,229. 
 226. A review of the “economically significant” rules finalized by EPA between 2001 and 2005 
found that 75% of those rules were challenged. See Johnson, Ossification’s Demise, supra note 10, 
at 771. This is consistent with statements made by former EPA Administrator William 
Ruckleshaus, who indicated that 80% of the agency’s major rules were litigated. Id. at 769. 
 227. See Nat. Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dept. of Defense, 138 S. Ct. 617, 633 (2018). 
 228. Even before there are any challenges to the repeal rule, though, a return to the pre-2015 
framework would revive a circuit split regarding the controlling opinion/test from Rapanos, with 
the net impact that the Clean Water Act—a national federal statute—would apply differently in 
different parts of the country. See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text. Although the 
agencies, in their supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking, indicated that it was necessary to 
repeal the 2015 rule because it had been challenged and invalidated by some courts, but was still 
enforced in many areas of the country, see supra note 225 and accompanying text, the agencies, in 
their final Step One rule indicated that the fact that the Step One rule may be challenged and 
invalidated in some courts, while applied in many areas of the country, was not a reason to prevent 
the agencies from finalizing the rule. Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification 
of Preexisting Rules, 84 Fed. Reg. 56,626, 56,629 (Oct. 22, 2019) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 
328). 
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Finally, the agencies asserted that reinstatement of the pre-2015 regulatory 
framework would provide for greater regulatory predictability, consistency, and 
certainty than the 2015 rule.229 However, one of the primary reasons that the 
agencies adopted the 2015 rule was a widespread perception that the pre-2015 
regulatory framework was not providing regulatory predictability, consistency, 
or certainty.230 Regarding the difficulties with the pre-2015 regulatory 
framework, the agencies noted, in the 2015 rule, “[t]his rule replaces existing 
procedures that often depend on individual, time-consuming, and inconsistent 
analyses of the relationship between a particular stream, wetland, lake, or other 
water with downstream waters.”231 The process of making those determinations 
was cumbersome and time-consuming in many cases and the decisions were 
fraught with litigation risk.232 The agencies’ assertion that the repeal of the 2015 
rule is necessary to ensure clarity, consistency, and predictability, therefore, is 
unreasonable.  
b. Failure to Engage with the Scientific Justifications for the 2015 Rule 
In the supplemental notice, the agencies spent very little time explaining 
why they believed that the science supporting the 2015 rule was invalid or why 
they did not believe that the science supported the rule. Instead of engaging with 
the science, they argued that calculation of “significant nexus” was a legal 
determination that required focus on Section 101(b) of the Clean Water Act.233 
 
 229. See Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Preexisting Rule, 83 
Fed. Reg. 32,227, 32,228 (proposed July 12, 2018) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328). 
 230. The agencies repeatedly discussed these perceptions in the preamble to the 2015 final rule. 
See 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,056–57. In particular, they noted, “Members of Congress, developers, 
farmers, state and local governments, energy companies, and many others requested new 
regulations to make the process of identifying waters protected under the CWA clearer, simpler, 
and faster.” Id. at 37,056. When the agencies finalized the Step One rule, they acknowledged that 
the pre-2015 regulatory framework was not providing regulatory predictability, certainty or 
consistency, but the agencies stressed that they felt that they had to repeal the 2015 rule as it was 
beyond their statutory authority. Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of 
Preexisting Rules, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56,627. 
 231. Id. at 37,057. 
 232. The agencies even acknowledged, in the supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking, that 
“implementation difficulties” existed in the pre-2015 regulatory framework. See Definition of 
“Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Preexisting Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. at 32,240. 
Nevertheless, they argued that the pre-2015 regulatory framework would somehow provide more 
consistency and clarity than the 2015 rule, which established bright line rules for large categories 
of waters to reduce the likelihood that jurisdictional determinations would be made on an 
inconsistent basis. Id. 
 233. See supra notes 218–219 and accompanying text. In the final Step One rule, the agencies 
repeated their assertions that it was inappropriate to rely on the Connectivity Study in the 2015 rule 
because the determination of “significant nexus” is a legal, rather than scientific, determination. 
See Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Preexisting Rules, 84 Fed. Reg. 
at 56,645. 
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The agencies attempted to downplay the importance of science to the 
determination of the “significant nexus” analysis by noting that Justice Kennedy, 
in Rapanos, wrote that scientific evidence provides “no reason to disregard 
limits in the statutory text.”234 However, Justice Kennedy’s full quote, edited by 
the agencies in the supplemental notice, provides, “[i]t is true, as the plurality 
indicates, that environmental concerns provide no reason to disregard limits in 
the statutory text, . . . but in my view the plurality’s opinion is not a correct 
reading of the text.”235 Justice Kennedy was merely acknowledging, as most 
judges would, that if a statute is clear, a court should not adopt an interpretation 
of the statute that is at odds with the clear language of the statute merely to 
advance the purposes of the statute. However, Justice Kennedy felt that the 
statute was far from clear in Rapanos. Thus, in the very next sentence, he wrote, 
“[t]he limits the plurality would impose, moreover, give insufficient deference 
to Congress’ purposes in enacting the Clean Water Act and to the authority of 
the Executive to implement that statutory mandate.”236  
Justice Kennedy’s statement in that sentence announced a theme that he 
raised repeatedly throughout his opinion. The “significant nexus” required for 
Clean Water Act jurisdiction “must be assessed in terms of the statute’s goals 
and purposes.”237 In describing what those goals and purposes were, Kennedy 
cited Section 101(a) of the statute and not Section 101(b). He wrote, “Congress 
enacted the law to ‘restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological 
integrity of the Nation’s waters . . . .’”238 He then outlined a science-based test 
that was drawn from the goals and purposes of the law. For instance, with regard 
to wetlands, he wrote that  
the rationale for Clean Water Act regulation is, as the Corps has recognized, that 
wetlands can perform critical functions related to the integrity of other waters—
functions such as pollutant trapping, flood control, and runoff storage. . . . 
Accordingly, wetlands possess the requisite nexus, and thus come within the 
statutory phrase “navigable waters,” if the wetlands, either alone or in 
combination with similarly situated lands in the region, significantly affect the 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other covered waters more readily 
understood as “navigable.”239 
Later in the opinion, he noted that it would be permissible for the Corps to  
identify categories of tributaries that, due to their volume of flow (either 
annually or on average), their proximity to navigable waters, or other relevant 
considerations, are significant enough that wetlands adjacent to them are likely, 
 
 234. See Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Preexisting Rule, 83 
Fed. Reg. at 32,236. 
 235. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 778 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. at 779. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. at 779–780. 
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in the majority of cases, to perform important functions for an aquatic system 
incorporating navigable waters.240 
It is clear, from Justice Kennedy’s opinion, that he wanted EPA and the Corps 
to rely on science and their expertise to determine when waters, alone or in 
combination with similarly situated lands in the region, significantly affect the 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other navigable waters. 
In addition to mis-characterizing Justice Kennedy’s statements in Rapanos 
regarding the importance of scientific justification for the agencies’ application 
of the “significant nexus” standard, the agencies, in their supplemental notice of 
proposed rulemaking, mis-characterized the weight that they gave to science and 
the Connectivity Study in the 2015 rule. While the agencies, in the supplemental 
notice of proposed rulemaking, suggested that they placed too much emphasis 
on the Connectivity Study in developing the 2015 rule instead of focusing on the 
text of the Clean Water Act and Congressional intent, the preamble to the 2015 
final rule repeatedly rebuts that claim. Although the agencies relied heavily on 
the Connectivity Study and the science to support their interpretation of the 
appropriate scope of Clean Water Act jurisdiction in the 2015 rule, the agencies 
repeatedly stressed that the determination of the scope of jurisdiction was based 
not only on science, but on the law and their expertise. 
For instance, in the preamble to the 2015 final rule, the agencies wrote,  
the agencies’ interpretive task in this rule—determining which waters have a 
“significant nexus”—requires scientific and policy judgment, as well as legal 
interpretation. The science demonstrates that waters fall along a gradient of 
chemical, physical, and biological connection to traditional navigable waters, 
and it is the agencies’ task to determine where along that gradient to draw lines 
of jurisdiction under the CWA. In making this determination, the agencies must 
rely, not only on the science, but also on their technical expertise and practical 
experience in implementing the CWA during a period of over 40 years.241  
More directly to the point, later in the preamble, the agencies wrote,  
[s]ignificant nexus is not a purely scientific determination. The opinions of the 
Supreme Court have noted that as the agencies charged with interpreting the 
statute, EPA and the Corps must develop the outer bounds of the scope of the 
CWA, while science does not provide bright line boundaries with respect to 
where “water ends” for purposes of the CWA. Therefore, the agencies’ 
interpretation of the CWA is informed by the Science Report and the review and 
comments of the SAB, but not dictated by them.242 
 
 240. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 781. 
 241. See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37054, 
37,057 (June 29, 2015) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328). 
 242. Id. at 37,060. On the following page, the agencies wrote, “[w]hile a significant nexus 
determination is primarily weighted in the scientific evidence and criteria, the agencies also 
consider the statutory language, the statute’s goals, objectives and policies, the case law, and the 
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As the agencies noted, “[t]he scientific literature does not use the term 
‘significant’ as it is defined in a legal context, but it does provide information on 
the strength of the effects on the chemical, physical, and biological functioning 
of the downstream water bodies from the connections among covered tributaries, 
covered adjacent waters, and case specific waters and those downstream 
waters.”243 Thus, the agencies were relying on science to help apply the legal 
test articulated by Justice Kennedy. Later, in describing the exclusions from the 
definition of “waters of the United States,” the agencies wrote, “[t]he significant 
nexus standard arises from the case law and is used to interpret the terms of the 
CWA. Thus, a significant nexus determination is not a purely scientific inquiry, 
but rather is a determination by the agencies in light of the statutory language, 
the statute’s goals, objectives and policies, the case law, the relevant science, 
and the agencies’ technical expertise and experience.”244 It is incorrect, 
therefore, for the agencies to claim, in the supplemental notice of proposed 
rulemaking, that the agencies gave improper weight to the Connectivity Study 
in the 2015 final rule.  
Since it was necessary to consider science, law, policy, and expertise in 
determining the scope of waters regulated under the Clean Water Act and since 
the agencies appropriately considered science in formulating the 2015 rule, 
failure to adequately discuss the agencies’ decisions to depart from the scientific 
findings that supported the 2015 rule when repealing it is arbitrary and 
capricious.  
V.  FLAWS IN THE APPLICABILITY DATE (“SUSPENSION”) RULEMAKING 
A. The Rulemaking 
The applicability date rule (or “suspension rule”), the second of the 
agencies’ three rules designed to repeal, postpone, or replace the 2015 rule, was 
the first rule that the agencies finalized. The agencies published a notice of 
proposed rulemaking for the rule on November 22, 2017, providing twenty-one 
days for public comment.245 As with the initial notice for the Step One rule, the 
agencies indicated, in the applicability date rulemaking notice, that the agencies 
would not consider comments, in the applicability date rulemaking, regarding 
the pre-2015 regulations, the 2015 rule, or the definition of “waters of the United 
States” that might be adopted in the future Step Two rulemaking.246 On February 
 
agencies’ technical expertise and experience when interpreting the terms of the CWA.” Id. at 
37,061. 
 243. Id. at 37,062. 
 244. Id. at 37,097. 
 245. See Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Addition of an Applicability Date to 
2015 Clean Water Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 55,542, 55,542 (proposed Nov. 22, 2017) (to be codified at 
33 C.F.R. pt. 328). 
 246. Id. at 55,544–45. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
414 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:373 
6, 2018, less than three months after publishing the notice of proposed 
rulemaking, and after receiving fewer than 5000 comments, the agencies 
published a final rule that added an “applicability date” to the 2015 WOTUS 
rule to delay implementation of the rule until February 6, 2020.247 
In the final rulemaking notice, the agencies indicated that the rule was being 
adopted to provide certainty for regulated entities, States, and the public and to 
preserve the status quo, because the rule would allow the agencies to continue 
to enforce the pre-2015 regulations that they were enforcing while the Sixth 
Circuit had stayed the 2015 rule even after the Supreme Court reached a decision 
that would lead the Sixth Circuit to lift that stay.248 Since courts had rejected 
several other efforts by the Trump Administration to rely on Section 705 of the 
APA or to rely on other statutory provisions to delay or postpone rules that had 
already gone into effect without repealing them through notice and comment 
rulemaking,249 the agencies attempted a new approach in the applicability date 
rulemaking. Since the 2015 rule included an “effective date” when it was 
published and since the rule went into effect in most of the country on August 
28, 2015, until it was stayed by the Sixth Circuit, the agencies’ rulemaking added 
an “applicability date” to the 2015 rule. The agencies argued that an “effective 
date” was simply a term of art that refers to the date that the Office of the Federal 
Register amends the Code of Federal Regulations, while an “applicability date” 
refers to the date that the rule will be implemented and enforced.250 The agencies 
argued that an “applicability date” can be included in the rule when it is initially 
published or it can be added later.251 
For purposes of the economic analysis required for the rule, the agencies 
compared the effect of postponing the 2015 rule until 2020 to a baseline set by 
the implementation of the pre-2015 regulations during the nationwide stay of the 
2015 rule, even though that stay was set to be lifted shortly after the rule was 
finalized.252 Using that baseline, the agencies concluded that the rule would have 
 
 247. See Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Addition of an Applicability Date to 
2015 Clean Water Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 5200, 5200 (Feb. 6, 2018) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 
328). 
 248. Id. The agencies argued that the extensive experience that the agencies had in making 
jurisdictional determinations under the pre-2015 regulations would contribute to the regulatory 
certainty. Id. at 5204. 
 249. See supra notes 175–79 and accompanying text. The agencies clearly indicated, in the 
final rule, that they were not relying on Section 705 of the APA to justify their action to postpone 
the 2015 rule. See Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Addition of an Applicability Date 
to 2015 Clean Water Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. at 5204. 
 250. See Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Addition of an Applicability Date to 
2015 Clean Water Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 5200, 5203 (Feb. 6, 2018) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 
328). 
 251. Id. at 5204. 
 252. Id. at 5202. 
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no economic costs and some unquantifiable benefits (due to the regulatory 
certainty that would be created by the rule).253  
B. Flaws in the Rulemaking 
When the rule was finalized, it was clear that the rule suffered from many 
of the flaws that had sidetracked other Trump Administration efforts to delay, 
repeal, or replace rules adopted in prior administrations. The limitations that the 
agencies placed on the scope of public comment closely resembled those that 
the North Carolina Growers Association court struck down as arbitrary and 
capricious and violating the APA procedures for informal rulemaking.254 The 
very short comment period could be challenged as a failure to provide an 
opportunity for meaningful public comment as required by the APA.255 The 
short comment period, the limitations on the scope of public comment, and 
several comments made by EPA Administrator Pruitt could all demonstrate 
evidence that the agencies were not proceeding with an open mind in the 
rulemaking, thus depriving the public of an opportunity for meaningful 
comment.256 In addition, the justification provided by the agencies for the 
addition of the applicability date was unreasonable, as the rule would not lead to 
regulatory certainty, as the agencies claimed.257 Further, the economic analysis 
for the rule was unreasonable, since the agencies measured the effects of the rule 
against an inappropriate baseline.258 Finally, the agencies failed to adequately 
 
 253. Id. at 5202–03. 
 254. See supra notes 137–143 and accompanying text. 
 255. See supra notes 128–131 and accompanying text. The agencies argued that the twenty-one 
day comment period was appropriate because the APA does not establish a minimum length for the 
comment period, courts had upheld comment periods less than 30 days, the scope of the rulemaking 
was narrow, and there was an urgent need to finalize the rule expeditiously. Definition of “Waters 
of the United States”—Addition of an Applicability Date to 2015 Clean Water Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 
at 5204. In addition, the agencies argued that the fact that they received over 4,600 comments 
indicated that there was an adequate opportunity for the public to meaningfully comment on the 
proposal. Id. 
 256. See supra notes 132–134 and accompanying text. The agencies argued that the litigation 
that the Administrator brought to challenge the 2015 rule before he was appointed Administrator 
and the comments that he made criticizing the 2015 rule before and after being appointed 
Administrator were not sufficient evidence of a closed mind to overcome a presumption of 
objectivity for agency officials. See 83 Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Addition of 
an Applicability Date to 2015 Clean Water Rule, Fed. Reg. 5200, 5205 (Feb. 6, 2018) (to be 
codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328). 
 257. As noted above, the 2015 rule was initially adopted because the pre-2015 regulations did 
not provide uniformity, consistency, or clarity. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. In 
addition, if the applicability rule were challenged and invalidated in some district courts, but upheld 
in others, there would be no more regulatory certainty than there would have been if the rule was 
never adopted. 
 258. Since the Sixth Circuit’s stay of the 2015 rule would be lifted shortly after the applicability 
date rule took effect, the economic analysis should have used, as a baseline, the scenario that would 
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explain why they had departed from the scientific and factual findings and legal 
and policy conclusions that led them to determine that it was appropriate to adopt 
the 2015 rule just three years earlier.259  
Not surprisingly, on the date that the agencies published the final rule, it was 
challenged in court. New York and nine other States sued EPA Administrator 
Pruitt in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, arguing 
that (1) the Clean Water Act did not give the agencies the authority to suspend 
the 2015 rule after its effective date passed; (2) the agencies did not provide a 
meaningful opportunity for comment because the comment period was too short 
and the agencies limited the scope of the comments; and (3) the agencies acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously by refusing to consider whether postponing the 2015 
rule would meet the objectives of the Clean Water Act and by ignoring the 
factual and legal findings that supported the 2015 rule.260 The Natural Resources 
Defense Council brought a separate lawsuit in the same court on the same day 
against EPA, raising similar arguments as the States.261  
While those cases were brought in New York, a coalition of conservation 
groups led by the South Carolina Coastal Conservation League sued EPA and 
the Corps in the U.S. District Court for South Carolina and, on August 16, 2018, 
the court, in South Carolina Coastal Conservation League v. Pruitt, invalidated 
the rule and issued a nationwide injunction against its enforcement.262 Citing the 
North Carolina Growers Association decision, which the court described as 
“almost identical” to the case brought by the conservation groups, the court held 
that the agencies’ refusal to allow public comment on the 2015 rule or the pre-
2015 regulations deprived the public of the meaningful opportunity to comment 
 
have been in place at that time, where the 2015 rule would be enforced in all states except for the 
states where the district court in North Dakota had stayed the rule. 
 259. The failure to address the prior factual, legal, and policy justifications for the 2015 rule 
renders the agencies’ rule arbitrary and capricious. See supra notes 147–153 and accompanying 
text. 
 260. See New York v. Pruitt, Case No. 1:18-cv-1030, Complaint (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 7, 2018). 
New York was joined in the lawsuit by California, Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, New 
Jersey, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, and the District of Columbia. Id. 
 261. See NRDC v. Environmental Protection Agency, Case No. 18-cv-1048, Complaint 
(S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 6, 2018). The plaintiffs argued that the agencies acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously by failing to repudiate or even discuss the scientific or other findings that supported 
the 2015 rule and by failing to provide a reasoned explanation for suspending the rule, as the only 
basis provided by the agency, regulatory certainty, had no record support and was contradicted by 
the evidence. Id. at 24–26. They also argued that the agencies did not provide a meaningful 
opportunity for comment on the rule because they engaged in the rulemaking with an unalterably 
closed mind and did not provide a sufficiently long period of time for comments. Id. at 26–27. In a 
separate action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, the Waterkeeper 
Alliance and several conservation groups added challenges to the applicability date rule to a lawsuit 
that they originally filed to challenge the 2015 rule. See Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. Pruitt, Case 
No. 18-cv-3521, Complaint (N.D. Cal. filed June 13, 2018). 
 262. See 318 F. Supp. 3d 959, 969 (D.S.C. 2018). 
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required by the APA.263 The court indicated that the short duration of the 
comment period was also a factor that led it to find that the agencies failed to 
provide the public with a meaningful opportunity for comment.264 Finally, the 
court held that the agencies’ failed to provide the “reasoned analysis” required 
by State Farm to justify their change in position regarding the 2015 rule and that 
the failure to allow comment on the 2015 rule or pre-2015 regulations was 
arbitrary and capricious.265 The court noted that “different administrations may 
implement different regulatory priorities, but the APA ‘requires that the pivot 
from one administration’s priorities to those of the next be accomplished with at 
least some fidelity to law and legal process.’”266 Even though the conservation 
groups’ challenge was brought in federal district court, the court determined that 
a nationwide injunction was appropriate because (1) the environmental plaintiffs 
were located throughout the United States; (2) the plaintiffs brought a facial 
challenge to agency action under the APA; and (3) a nationwide injunction was 
necessary to provide complete relief for the plaintiffs.267 A few months later, in 
Puget Soundkeeper Alliance v. Wheeler, the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Washington issued a similar ruling, invalidating the rule and 
enjoining it nationwide after finding that the agencies acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously and failed to provide an opportunity for meaningful public 
comment by limiting the scope of public comment on the rule.268  
The agencies initially appealed the South Carolina Coastal Conservation 
League decision, but later withdrew their appeal to focus on the Step One and 
Step Two rulemakings.269  
 
 263. Id. at 963. 
 264. Id. As in the North Carolina Growers Association case, the court noted that the suspension 
rule received significantly fewer comments during the abbreviated comment period than the 2015 
rule which it was repealing received when it was issued with a sixty-day comment period. Id. 
 265. Id. at 967. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Pruitt, 318 F. Supp. at 968–69. The Court cited the Supreme Court’s ruling in Califano v. 
Yamaski, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979) for the proposition that “the scope of injunctive relief is dictated 
by the extent of the violation established, not by the geographical extent of the plaintiff class.” See 
id. at 968. While recognizing that nationwide injunctions “have the potential for abuse,” the court 
felt that a nationwide injunction was necessary because the effects of the suspension rule were felt 
nationwide. Id. at 969 n.4. 
 268. See No. C15-1342-JCC, 2018 WL 6169196, at *6 (W.D. Wash. 2018). The challengers 
also argued that the agencies acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to address the findings for 
the 2015 rule when postponing it and failing to provide a rational justification for the postponement, 
but the court determined that it was not necessary to resolve those claims since it was already 
enjoining the rule for other APA violations. Id. at *4. 
 269. See David Schultz, Administration Drops Effort to Delay Obama’s Waters Rule, 
BLOOMBERG ENV’T (March 9), 2019, https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/environment-and-
energy/administration-drops-effort-to-delay-obamas-waters-rule [https://perma.cc/2XUW-GD8A] 
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VI.  FLAWS IN THE STEP TWO (“REPLACEMENT”) RULEMAKING 
A. The Proposed Rulemaking 
On February 14, 2019, the agencies published a notice of proposed 
rulemaking for the Step Two (“replacement”) rule, the third rulemaking initiated 
by the agencies to repeal, postpone, or replace the 2015 WOTUS rule.270 The 
agencies began the development of the proposed rule by meeting with 
representatives of states, local governments, and tribes in April 2017 and 
conducting a series of webinars with other stakeholders in the fall of that year, 
before conducting additional meetings with states.271 As with the other two 
rules, the agencies asserted that the replacement rule was necessary to ensure 
clarity, consistency, and predictability, since litigation surrounding the 2015 rule 
had created inconsistent interpretation and application of the Clean Water 
Act.272 Unlike the other two rules, though, in the Step Two rulemaking proposal, 
the agencies made significant changes to their prior legal interpretation of the 
Clean Water Act and their long-standing interpretations of the Rapanos and 
SWANCC decisions. 
Although the agencies acknowledged that the regulatory definition of 
“waters of the United States” should advance the Section 101(a) objectives of 
restoring and maintaining water quality, the agencies stressed that the definition 
must also implement the policy of Section 101(b) to “recognize, preserve and 
protect the primary responsibilities of States to prevent, reduce and eliminate 
pollution,” and “to plan the development and use . . . of land and water 
resources.”273 Relying on dictionary definitions, the agencies argued that 
“policies” must be carried out, while “objectives” are merely aspirational.274 
Proceeding from those assumptions, the agencies noted that Congress, in Section 
101(a), established non-enforceable goals in addition to setting forth an 
overriding objective.275 To fulfill those goals, the agencies argued, Congress 
 
 270. See Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg. 4154, 4154 
(proposed Feb. 14, 2019) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328). 
 271. Id. at 4162–63. The agencies held one public hearing on the proposed rule and received 
almost 150,000 comments on the proposal. See Revised Definition of Waters of the United States, 
EPA Docket # EPA-HQ-OW-2018-0149, ENVTL PROT. AGENCY (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.regu 
lations.gov/docket?D’EPA-HQ-OW-2018-0149-0003 [https://perma.cc/2TTL-R7TU]. 
 272. Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg. at 4154, 4197. The 
agencies also suggested that the narrowing of jurisdiction proposed by the rule was necessary to 
ensure that the agencies were operating within their Commerce Clause authority. Id. at 4156. 
 273. Id. at 4156. The agencies claimed that the proposed rule strikes a balance between the 
objectives of Section 101(a) and the policies of section 101(b). Id. 
 274. Id. at 4163–64. Thus, the agencies indicated that they must “pursue” the objectives of the 
statute, “aim to accomplish” the goals of the statute, but “implement” the policies. Id. 
 275. Id. at 4156. In Section 101(a), Congress set goals to eliminate the discharge of pollutants 
into the navigable waters by 1985 and to achieve water quality “which provides for the protection 
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created several non-regulatory programs in the Clean Water Act, including 
programs to address non-point source pollution, to provide infrastructure 
funding, and to require water pollution planning.276 The non-regulatory 
programs, they asserted, control pollution in the Nation’s waters generally, while 
Congress created a regulatory permitting program to address discharges of 
pollutants into a subset of those waters identified as “waters of the United 
States.”277 The regulatory and non-regulatory programs work together to achieve 
the objectives of Section 101(a), they argued, but the “waters of the United 
States” to be regulated under the permitting program must be defined in a way 
that preserves sovereignty of states over their land and water resources.278 
According to the agencies, therefore, since non-regulatory programs apply to the 
Nation’s waters generally and help achieve the objectives of Section 101(a), it 
is necessary to limit the scope of federal jurisdiction over “waters of the United 
States” subject to the regulatory permitting requirements in order to carry out 
the policy of Section 101(b). This was only the first of many legal re-
interpretations advanced by the agencies in the notice of proposed rulemaking. 
Unlike the 2015 rule or the pre-2015 regulations and guidance, the proposed 
Step Two rule relied heavily on the Rapanos plurality’s test as the primary basis 
for determining the scope of “waters of the United States,” as mandated by the 
President’s Executive Order, and the agencies reversed several of their prior 
positions interpreting Justice Kennedy’s Rapanos opinion in the proposed 
rulemaking.279 As a threshold matter, the agencies relied on the Rapanos 
plurality to indicate, as a baseline, that the agencies were regulating “waters” 
within the “ordinary meaning” of the term, including relatively permanent 
flowing and standing waterbodies, such as oceans, rivers, streams, lakes, ponds, 
and wetlands.280 As a consequence, the agencies defined “tributaries” in the 
proposed rule to exclude “ephemeral” streams281 and requested comment on 
 
and propagation of fish, shellfish and wildlife and provides for recreation in and on the water . . . 
by July 1, 1983 . . . .” See 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2012). 
 276. See Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg. 4154, 4157 
(proposed Feb. 14, 2019) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328). 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. at 4155. When the agencies finalized their Step One rule, they noted that they were not 
taking a position on whether Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Rapanos was the appropriate 
test for determining jurisdiction over “waters of the United States,” but they were repealing the 
2015 rule because it was based on that test and the agencies concluded that it exceeded the 
boundaries authorized by that test. See Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification 
of Preexisting Rules, 84 Fed. Reg. 56,626, 56,629 (Oct. 22, 2019) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 
328) 
 280. See Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg. 4154, 4169–70 
(proposed Feb. 14, 2019) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328). 
 281. Id. at 4173. The proposal defines a tributary as “a river, stream or similar naturally 
occurring surface water channel that contributes perennial or intermittent flow to a traditional 
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whether the definition should also exclude “intermittent” streams.282 In adopting 
that definition, the agencies acknowledged that they were changing their long-
standing interpretation of the Rapanos decision as authorizing regulation of 
intermittent and ephemeral streams that had a “significant nexus” to traditional 
navigable waters.283 They also suggested that they may have incorrectly 
interpreted Justice Kennedy’s Rapanos concurring opinion in the past by using 
the “significant nexus” test to determine jurisdiction over “waters of the United 
States” generally, as opposed to limiting its use to determining jurisdiction over 
wetlands similar to the wetlands at issue in Rapanos.284 The proposed rule 
frequently criticized the agencies’ prior reliance on their interpretation of Justice 
Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test, suggesting that the jurisdictional question 
should not be resolved based on “the opinion of a single justice in a complex 
case.”285  
In addition to narrowing their definition of “tributaries,” the agencies 
narrowed their jurisdiction over adjacent wetlands in the proposed rule, 
regulating only wetlands that “abut” jurisdictional waters or have a direct 
hydrological surface connection to other jurisdictional waters in a typical 
year.286 Furthermore, the agencies proposed to eliminate the long-standing case-
by-case analysis of waters under Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test as a 
basis for determining jurisdiction287 and to eliminate the regulation of interstate 
waters, which had been regulated as a separate category of waters even in the 
pre-2015 regulations, unless those waters fit within another category of 
regulated waters.288  
While the agencies spent a significant amount of time in the proposed 
rulemaking discussing the legal justifications for the changes in the Step Two 
rule from the 2015 rule, they spent very little time rebutting, challenging, 
discounting, or even discussing the Connectivity Study and the scientific 
findings that supported the 2015 rule. The agencies stressed that the proposed 
definition in the Step Two rule was “a legal and policy decision informed by the 
 
navigable water or territorial sea in a typical year either directly or indirectly through other 
tributaries, jurisdictional ditches, jurisdictional lakes and ponds, jurisdictional impoundments, and 
adjacent wetlands . . . .” Id. at 4155. Later in the proposal, the agencies indicated “tributaries . . . 
do not include surface features that flow only in direct response to precipitation, such as ephemeral 
flows, dry washes, arroyos, and similar features.” Id. at 4173. They based their exclusion on the 
Rapanos plurality opinion. Id. at 4170, 4174. 
 282. Id. at 4177. 
 283. Id. at 4175. 
 284. Id. at 4175, 4196. 
 285. Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg. 4154, 4196 (proposed 
Feb. 14, 2019) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328). 
 286. Id. at 4155. Once again, the agencies’ narrower definition was based on the Rapanos 
plurality opinion. Id. at 4188. 
 287. Id. at 4170. 
 288. Id. at 4171. 
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statute, its legislative history, Supreme Court interpretations, and the agencies’ 
respect for the traditional power of States . . .” and that the Connectivity Study 
was “a science, not policy, document . . . .”289  
While regulated entities and some states were pleased with the proposed 
rule, scientists and environmental groups strongly criticized the rule because the 
agencies were ignoring the science that supported the 2015 rule.290 The 
agencies’ own data suggests that 18% of streams are ephemeral streams and 
would no longer be protected under the rule.291 If intermittent streams are also 
excluded in the final rule, almost 59% of the streams in the continental United 
States would be left unprotected by the rule.292 In addition, under the proposed 
definition of “adjacent” waters, the agencies’ data suggests that almost 51% of 
wetlands would no longer be regulated as “waters of the United States.”293 Some 
areas of the country would be affected particularly acutely. Scientists predict 
that more than 75% of Ohio’s streams would no longer be regulated,294 70% of 
South Carolina’s wetlands would no longer be regulated,295 and 81% of the 
streams in the Southwest would no longer be regulated.296 Scientists are 
particularly concerned because they predict that ephemeral and intermittent 
streams will play a greater role in water quality protection and flood protection 
as climate change brings more storms and flooding.297 Critics of the rule have 
 
 289. Id. at 4175–76. 
 290. See, e.g., David M. Uhlmann, Trump Wants to Weaken Clean-Water Rules, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/12/opinion/trump-clean-water-weaken-
rules.html [https://perma.cc/3EGH-JYM4]; Dave Owen, The New WOTUS Proposed Rule and the 
Myths of Clean Water Act Federalism, ENVTL LAW PROF. BLOG (Dec. 11, 2018), https://lawpro 
fessors.typepad.com/environmental_law/2018/12/the-new-wotus-proposed-rule-and-the-myths-of 
-clean-water-act-federalism.html [https://perma.cc/6SWQ-WNV3]; Jackson, supra note 107; See 
Beth Burger, Proposed Change Would Leave Most Ohio Streams Unprotected, Environmentalists 
Say, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Apr. 1, 2019), https://www.dispatch.com/news/20190401/proposed-
change-would-leave-most-ohio-streams-unprotected-environmentalists-say [https://perma.cc/2CS 
P-M9GD]. 
 291. See Ariel Wittenberg & Kevin Bogardus, EPA Falsely Claims ‘No Data’ on Waters in 
WOTUS Rule, E&E NEWS (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060109323 
[https://perma.cc/88YY-KU73]. 
 292. See Jackson, supra note 107; Parenteau, supra note 85, at 383 (predicting 60% of stream 
miles would no longer be regulated, based on EPA and Corps data). 
 293. See Wittenberg & Bogardus, supra note 291. 
 294. See Burger, supra note 290. 
 295. See Chloe Johnson, SC Wetlands—Prized for Habitat and Flood Buffer—Lose Protection 
under Trump Water Rule, POST & COURIER (Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.postandcourier.com/ 
news/sc-wetlands-prized-for-habitat-and-flood-buffer-lose-protection/article_e8b1b568-15e7-11e 
9-9f73-fb66dc7843a5.html [https://perma.cc/VRH8-VKWX]. 
 296. See Jackson, supra note 107. 
 297. See Uhlmann, supra note 290. See also Owen, supra note 290 (outlining the benefits of 
intermittent and ephemeral streams). 
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also argued that the rule could jeopardize more than one hundred thousand jobs 
in the ecological mitigation industry.298  
In addition to those concerns, during the comment period for the 
rulemaking, the Association of State Wetland Managers (“ASWM”) raised 
several policy concerns to the agencies regarding the impact of the proposal on 
States. While the agencies argued that the proposed rule would not eliminate 
protection for streams and wetlands, but merely transfer regulatory authority for 
those waters to States, ASWM pointed out that many of those waters would not 
be protected because some states have passed laws that prohibit the states from 
protecting waters that are not protected by the federal government and many 
states may lack the funding and resources to expand their programs to protect 
additional waters that are removed from federal jurisdiction.299 ASWM also 
raised concerns that (1) the proposed reduction in federal jurisdiction would 
reduce incentives for States to assume responsibility for administering the 
federal Section 404 permitting program; (2) waters that are no longer regulated 
by the federal government would no longer receive the protection they currently 
receive under the National Environmental Policy Act, the Endangered Species 
Act, and other federal laws triggered by the Section 404 permitting process; (3) 
the public may view waters that are not protected by the federal government as 
less valuable than “waters of the United States”; and (4) the proposed reduction 
in federal jurisdiction could create interstate disparity and inconsistency in 
protecting waters, as states “race to the bottom” in establishing water quality 
protection programs.300 
 
 298. See Jackson, supra note 107. In 2015, researchers at the University of North Carolina and 
Yale determined that ecological mitigation programs add up to $9.5 billion and 126,000 jobs to the 
American economy every year. Id. An earlier University of Massachusetts study found that 
reforestation and land and watershed restoration work add thirty-nine jobs for every $1 million 
invested, while the coal industry adds only six jobs for every $1 million invested. Id. 
 299. See Association of State Wetland Managers, Inc., Comments on the February 14, 2019 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for “Revised Definition of Waters of the United States,” 3–5 (Apr. 
15, 2019), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OW-2018-0149-4897 [https://per 
ma.cc/BY9G-FD3X] [hereinafter ASWM 2019 Comments]. Thirty-six states have laws that could 
limit the authority of states to regulate waters that are removed from federal jurisdiction. See 
Environmental Law Institute, State Constraints: State-Imposed Limitations on the Authority of 
Agencies to Regulate Waters Beyond the Scope of the Federal Clean Water Act (May 2013), 
https://www.eli.org/sites/default/files/eli-pubs/d23-04.pdf [https://perma.cc/KM32-7M8Q]. 
According to a 2015 ASWM survey, only twenty-three states have laws that regulate activities that 
affect wetlands. See Status and Trend Report on State Wetland Programs in the United States, 
ASWM (2015), https://www.aswm.org/pdf_lib/state_summaries/status_and_trends_report_on_ 
state_wetland_programs_in_the_united_states_102015.pdf [https://perma.cc/VS8Y-5L95]. 
 300. See ASWM 2019 Comments, supra note 299 at 3–5. 
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B. Flaws in the Proposed Rulemaking 
If the Step Two replacement rule is finalized in a form similar to the 
proposed rule, it would have serious flaws that should lead to its invalidation. In 
the proposed rulemaking, the agencies have (1) adopted an interpretation of the 
Clean Water Act that runs counter to the plain language and structure of the 
statute; (2) mis-read the Supreme Court’s Rapanos decision and inappropriately 
relied on the plurality opinion to support the rule; (3) failed to rationally explain 
their departure from their prior legal interpretation of the Clean Water Act and 
the Supreme Court’s Rapanos and SWANCC decisions; and (4) failed to provide 
a rational explanation for their change in interpretation of the science behind the 
2015 rule.301  
1. Flawed Statutory Interpretation—Section 101(a) and 101(b)—Plain 
Meaning 
The Clean Water Act should be interpreted in a manner that advances the 
goals and objectives of Section 101(a)302 and should not be interpreted to give 
precedence to the policies of Section 101(b)303 over those goals and objectives. 
In the proposed rulemaking, the agencies inappropriately asserted that the statute 
should be interpreted to advance the policies of Section 101(b), even though 
such interpretation would frustrate the objectives of Section 101(a).  
The very first sentence of Public Law 92-500, creating the modern Clean 
Water Act, establishes the objective of the statute in Section 101(a) “to restore 
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s 
waters.”304 Section 101(a) also outlines some aspirational goals for the statute, 
including eliminating the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters by 
1985 and attaining water quality that provides for the protection and propagation 
 
 301. In addition to those flaws, the Attorneys General for fourteen States and the District of 
Columbia argued, in their comments to the agencies on the proposed rulemaking, that the agencies’ 
exclusion of interstate waters as a separate category of “waters of the United States” is contrary to 
the Clean Water Act, contrary to legal precedent, and that the agencies did not provide a rational 
explanation for changing their prior approach to regulating interstate waters as a category of “waters 
of the United States.” See Attorney Generals of New York, California, Connecticut, Maine, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, 
Virginia, Washington, and the District of Columbia, Comments on the February 14, 2019 Notice 
of Proposed Rulemaking for ‘Revised Definition of Waters of the United States’ (Apr. 15, 2019), 
https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-becerra-tells-epa-and-army-corps-with 
draw-proposal-eliminating [https://perma.cc/AH6N-629S]. The Attorneys General and the 
Association of State Wetland Managers both also argued, in their comments on the proposed 
rulemaking, that the agencies acted arbitrarily and capriciously by relying on the economic studies 
provided to justify the Step Two rulemaking. Id. at 31–33; ASWM 2019 Comments, supra note 299, 
at 25–29. 
 302. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012). 
 303. Id. § 1251(b). 
 304. Id. § 1251(a). 
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of fish, shellfish and wildlife, and provides for recreation in and on the water by 
July 1, 1983.305 In a subsequent provision, Section 101(b), Congress outlined a 
policy of the statute “to recognize, preserve and protect the primary 
responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce and eliminate pollution 
. . . and to plan the development and use . . . of land and water resources.”306 
In the proposed Step Two rulemaking, EPA and the Corps argued that the 
terms “policy,” “goal,” and “objective” have different meanings and that 
Congress acted intentionally when identifying policies, goals, and objectives 
separately.307 The agencies relied on dictionary definitions of the terms “policy” 
and “objective” to suggest that, based on the ordinary meaning of those terms, 
objectives and goals are not binding, while policies are binding.308 Following up 
on that line of argument, they suggested that the policy of Section 101(b) is 
superior to the goals and objectives of section 101(a), so that the Clean Water 
Act should be interpreted to advance the policy of Section 101(b) even though 
it may frustrate the objectives of Section 101(a).309 However, the agencies 
mischaracterized the relationship between goals, outcomes, and policies. Even 
though the goals of Section 101(a)(1) and (2) are not binding, neither are the 
policies of Section 101(b) or any other section of the statute that identifies 
policies. The objectives outlined in Section 101, though, are separate from the 
goals outlined in Section 101(a)(1) and (2). An objective is defined in Webster’s 
Dictionary as “something toward which effort is directed; an aim . . . or end of 
action,”310 while a policy is defined as “a definite course or method of action 
selected from among alternatives and in light of given conditions to guide and 
determine present and future decisions.”311 In light of those definitions, the 
objective is the end, while policies are the means to achieve the end. In 
examining ways to achieve an objective, a decision-maker may be guided by 
certain policies to choose among approaches that will achieve the objective. 
However, the policies are subservient to the objective. The decision-maker 
should not treat a policy as the end to which effort is directed. In the proposed 
rulemaking, the agencies correctly noted that there is a distinction between the 
 
 305. Id. §§ 1251(a)(1), 1251(a)(2). 
 306. Id. § 1251(b). 
 307. See Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg. 4154, 4163 
(proposed Feb. 14, 2019) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328). 
 308. Id. at 4163–64. 
 309. Id. at 4164 (noting that the word choices of Congress require the agencies to “aim to 
accomplish the goals of the Act while implementing the specific policy directives of Congress”) 
(emphasis added). 
 310. See Objective, Merriam Webster (online edition), https://www.merriam-webster.com/dic 
tionary/objective [https://perma.cc/SF4W-CNPX]. The agencies cited a similar definition for 
objective in their proposed rulemaking. See 84 Fed. Reg. at 4163. 
 311. See Policy, Merriam Webster (online edition), https://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/policy [https://perma.cc/Y5HK-BLBF]. The agencies cited a similar definition for 
policy in their proposed rulemaking. See 84 Fed. Reg. at 4163. 
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word choices made by Congress in identifying the outcomes of the Clean Water 
Act in Section 101(a) and policies in Section 101(b).312 However, the agencies 
incorrectly interpreted the difference between the priority of the terms.  
A review of the legislative history of Public Law 92-500 demonstrates that 
the Conference Report for the legislation, in describing Section 101 of the Act, 
focuses on the objectives and goals of Section 101(a), but is silent regarding 
section 101(b).313 Similarly, during Senate consideration of the bill reported 
from the Conference Committee, there were nine references to the objectives 
and goals of Section 101(a), but no references to Section 101(b).314 The primary 
concern of the Congress that enacted the Clean Water Act was “restor[ing] and 
maintain[ing] the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s 
waters,” and the agencies, in their proposed rulemaking, attempted to 
subordinate that concern to the “policy” of Section 101(b).315 That is 
inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of the terms, “objectives,” “goals,” and 
“policies,” and is inconsistent with the intent of the enacting Congress.316  
Thus, in interpreting and administering the statute, the agencies should be 
guided first and foremost by the objectives of Section 101(a). If there are a 
variety of ways to achieve those objectives, some of which interfere with states’ 
abilities to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, and plan the use and 
development of land and water resources and some of which do not, then the 
agency should implement the approaches that do not interfere with state 
authority. However, the agencies should not adopt an interpretation of the statute 
to advance states’ rights when it interferes with achieving the objectives of the 
statute. Since the proposed rule does that, it is outside of the agencies’ statutory 
authority.  
2. Flawed Statutory Interpretation—Section 101(a) and 101(b)—
Structure of the Statute 
In the proposed Step Two rulemaking, the agencies argued that the term 
“waters of the United States” under the Clean Water Act should be interpreted 
 
 312. See Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg. at 4164 (citing Nat’l 
Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 544 (2012)) (“[w]here Congress uses certain 
language in one part of a statute and different language in another, it is generally presumed that 
Congress acts intentionally”). 
 313. See S. Rep. No. 92–1236, at 99–100 (reprinted in COMM. ON PUB. WORKS, 93d Cong., 1 
A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS of 1972, at 
281, 282–83 (Jan. 1973)). 
 314. See 118 Cong. Rec. S33692–718 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1972) (debate on Conference Report) 
(reprinted in COMM. ON PUB. WORKS, 93d Cong., 1 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER 
POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS of 1972, at 161–223 (Jan. 1973)). 
 315. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012); 33 U.S.C. § 101(b) (2012). 
 316. See New Prime v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 539 (2019) (noting that words should be 
“interpreted as taking their ordinary meaning . . . at the time Congress enacted the statute”). 
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narrowly based on the structure of the statute. To the extent that there is any 
tension between Sections 101(a) and 101(b), the Supreme Court resolved the 
tension in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, when the Court held that EPA and the Corps could regulate, under 
the Clean Water Act, any waters that have a “significant nexus” to traditional 
navigable waters.317 The proposed rulemaking should have included, in the 
definition of “waters of the United States,” all waters that have a “significant 
nexus” to traditional navigable waters.  
EPA and the Corps argued, in the proposed rulemaking, that Congress 
intended to achieve the goals of Section 101(a) by creating non-regulatory 
programs that apply to all waters and a permit program that applies to a much 
narrower set of “navigable” waters.318 They argued that, in order to carry out the 
policy of Section 101(b), and in recognition of the protection of State authority 
in Section 510, the statute should be interpreted narrowly to limit the scope of 
waters regulated under the federal permitting program, as waters can be 
protected without being regulated under the permitting program.319  
Although the grant programs, technical assistance programs, and watershed 
planning programs created for states under the Clean Water Act may apply to 
some waters that are not regulated under the Sections 402 or 404 permitting 
programs,320 that does not mean that federal jurisdiction over “waters of the 
United States” should be interpreted narrowly. Those state grant, technical 
assistance, and planning programs are designed to supplement the protections 
provided by the federal permitting program, rather than to replace them.321  
Narrowing the scope of federal jurisdiction over “waters of the United 
States” is not necessary to advance the policies of Sections 101(b) or 510.322 The 
statute, as currently interpreted and implemented, recognizes and respects the 
 
 317. See 531 U.S. 159, 167–73 (2001). 
 318. See Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg. 4154, 4157 
(proposed Feb. 14, 2019) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328). 
 319. Id. at 4157, 4169. 
 320. Id. at 4156. 
 321. In their notice of proposed rulemaking, EPA and the Corps argued that “[c]ontrolling all 
waters using the Act’s federal regulatory mechanisms would significantly reduce the need for the 
more holistic planning provisions of the Act and the state partnerships they entail.” See 84 Fed. 
Reg. at 4169. That assertion is erroneous for several reasons. First, neither the 2015 rule or any rule 
ever proposed or adopted by the agencies attempt to control “all waters” in the states. Even if the 
agencies interpreted the term “waters of the United States” broadly enough to include all waters in 
a state, though, the Section 402 and 404 permit programs only apply to point source discharges, 
see 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2012), and the regulations adopted by EPA to implement the Section 402 
and 404 programs do not target all pollutants that harm health or the environment. State planning 
and partnerships with the federal government would still be necessary to address those discharges 
or pollutants that are not regulated under the 402 and 404 permitting programs or to address other 
problems that are not being sufficiently prevented by the federal permitting programs. 
 322. See 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (2012). 
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important role of states while working to achieve the objectives of 101(a). 
Section 510 provides that the Clean Water Act does not preempt state regulation 
of water pollution and allows states to be more restrictive, but not less restrictive, 
than the federal government when protecting water quality.323 That provision 
allows states to adopt and implement their own water pollution control programs 
and envisions joint and cooperative federal and state regulation. Nothing in 
Section 510 should be read to limit the scope of federal authority over waters of 
the United States.  
Sections 101(b) and 510 are advanced by several other provisions in the 
Clean Water Act that establish a cooperative federal/state regulatory program, 
including the 401 certification process and provisions regarding delegation or 
assumption of the federal permitting programs. 
The Clean Water Act authorizes states to administer the federal Section 402 
and 404 permitting programs (with the exception of permitting for Class I 
waters).324 Thus, even if the federal definition of “waters of the United States” 
is broad, states have the option of taking over the programs, which allows them 
to carry out their “responsibilities and rights . . . to prevent, reduce, and eliminate 
pollution . . . and to plan the development and use . . . of land and water 
resources.”325 A narrower definition of “waters of the United States” could 
increase the regulatory burden for states, as many states that currently choose to 
not take over the federal permitting program because the federal government is 
adequately protecting the waters in those states may need to regulate additional 
waters in their state permitting programs if federal jurisdiction is reduced.326  
In addition to the delegation and assumption authorities provided to states 
under the Clean Water Act, Section 401 of the Act authorizes States to impose 
 
 323. Id. 
 324. See id. §§ 1342(b), 1344(g). 
 325. States may complain that, even if they take over the Section 402 and 404 permitting 
programs, a broader definition of “waters of the United States” limits their ability to approve 
permits for construction activities that result in a discharge of pollutants or addition of dredged or 
fill material into waters under federal jurisdiction. While the designation of waters as “waters of 
the United States” may impose some limits on the ability of States to allow land uses that harm the 
environment, Section 101(b) should not be read to provide that the federal government cannot 
impose any limits on States’ control of land use. After all, Section 101(b) refers to the “primary” 
rights and responsibilities of States, rather than the “exclusive” rights and responsibilities of States. 
Section 101(b) should be read to allow federal regulation of waters when necessary to achieve the 
objectives and goals of Section 101(a). 
 326. Admittedly, a broader definition of “waters of the United States” could impose regulatory 
costs on states because states are required to establish water quality standards, 33 U.S.C. § 1313 
(2012), and total maximum daily loads (“TMDL”), id. § 1313(d), for jurisdictional waters. Thus, if 
the jurisdiction over “waters of the United States” is broad, there are more waters for which states 
must create water quality standards and TMDLs. However, under the Clean Water Act, EPA will 
establish those standards if States don’t. See id. §§ 1313(b), 1313(c). Therefore, States can avoid 
any additional costs if they do not wish to establish standards to protect those waters. 
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conditions on federal permits to protect the waters of their State, even when the 
State has not taken over a federal Clean Water Act permitting program.327 Once 
again, this is designed to advance the policies of Section 101(b). If the scope of 
federal jurisdiction over “waters of the United States” is narrowed, states lose 
that authority over those waters and will have to regulate them under state law 
to protect them. According to comments provided by the Association of State 
Wetland Managers on the supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking 
regarding the repeal rule, only twenty-four states have independent dredge and 
fill permitting authority.328 The rest rely on 401 certification.  
Narrowing the definition of “waters of the United States” as proposed by the 
agencies would frustrate the objectives of Section 101(a) and the policies of 
Section 101(b) in another important way. Federal regulation of “waters of the 
United States” is important because it protects waters that impact more than one 
state and which cannot be controlled by states beyond their own boundaries.329 
States cannot regulate upstream activities that occur in other states that can harm 
their water quality. The Supreme Court recognized the important role that the 
federal government plays in regulating water bodies that affect multiple States 
when it wrote, in International Paper Company v. Oullette, “[w]hile source 
States have a strong voice in regulating their own pollution, the CWA 
contemplates a much lesser role for States that share an interstate waterway with 
the . . . affected States.”330 Representative Gross discussed concerns regarding 
the lax nature of state pollution control prior to the enactment of the Clean Water 
Act when, during the House debate on the bill that became Public Law 92-500, 
he noted that “[t]hrough the years the States and the local subdivisions of 
government, including the municipalities, failed to enforce laws and ordinances 
 
 327. See id. § 1341. 
 328. See Association of State Wetland Managers, Comments of the Association of State 
Wetland Managers to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers in Response to the July 12, 2018 Federal Register Supplemental Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking Regarding Definition of ‘Waters of the United States’ - Recodification of Preexisting 
Rule at 6 (Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.aswm.org/pdf_lib/comment_supplemental_notice_%20step 
_1_080818.pdf [https://perma.cc/H9Z2-2NEY] [hereinafter “ASWM 2018 Comments”]. 
 329. See ASWM 2019 Comments, supra note 299, at 5. In its comments on the proposed Step 
Two rulemaking, the Association of state Wetland Managers argued that the federal role in 
administration of the Clean Water Act is essential to the states in protecting states and tribes from 
interstate impacts, in ensuring that national level concerns (such as hurricane protection, drought 
minimization prevention, minimization of flooding, etc.) are adequately considered, in avoiding 
potential impacts on water use allocations by states, in providing protection of habitat, in 
maintaining a level economic playing field, and in effectively addressing emerging pollutants as 
they are identified and as novel pollution control methods are developed. Id. 
 330. See 479 U.S. 481, 490 (1987). A long line of Supreme Court cases recognize that federal 
law can supersede state law to protect air and water quality even though federal law is regulating 
traditional state activities such as land use. See, e.g., Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 105–06 
(1972); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907). 
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in the matter of pollution and especially the polluting of streams.”331 When the 
scope of federal jurisdiction over “waters of the United States” is reduced, states 
become more vulnerable to pollution of their waters caused by lax regulation in 
other states. That result conflicts with the objectives of Section 101(a) and the 
policies of Section 101(b) to protect states’ rights and responsibilities.332  
The narrowing interpretation that was proposed by the agencies in the Step 
Two rulemaking could also frustrate the objectives of Section 101(a) because it 
could lead states to adopt complex, confusing, and inconsistent programs to 
regulate the waters that are eliminated from federal protection. States raised 
these concerns in response to a 2003 advance notice of proposed rulemaking to 
redefine “waters of the United States” after the Solid Waste Agency of Northern 
Cook County decision.333 
While there are many reasons why the term “waters of the United States” 
should not be interpreted narrowly to reconcile a tension between Sections 
101(a) and 101(b) of the Clean Water Act, the primary reason, as noted above, 
is that the Supreme Court has already reconciled the tension in Solid Waste 
Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. In that 
decision, the Court explicitly noted that interpreting the Clean Water Act to 
authorize the regulation of the isolated waters at issue in that case, based on the 
migratory bird test, could encroach on a traditional state power.334 In reading the 
statute narrowly to find that it did not authorize jurisdiction in the case, the Court 
stressed that the “significant nexus” between wetlands and traditional navigable 
waters that existed in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, informed the 
Court’s interpretation of the scope of “waters of the United States” under the 
Clean Water Act.335 The message provided by the Court is clear. When a water 
has a “significant nexus” to a traditional navigable water, federal regulation of 
the water under the Clean Water Act does not violate the policies of Section 
101(b). Thus, in crafting their proposed rule to redefine “waters of the United 
States,” the agencies should have applied the “significant nexus” test, rather than 
attempting to reinterpret the relationship between Sections 101(a) and 101(b). 
Since they didn’t, they acted outside of their statutory authority.  
 
 331. See 118 Cong. Rec. H10203 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1972) (statement of Rep. Gross) (reprinted 
in COMM. ON PUB. WORKS, 93d Cong., 1 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION 
CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS of 1972, at 349 (Jan. 1973)). 
 332. Justice Kennedy explained in his Rapanos concurrence that the Clean Water Act policy of 
respecting states’ rights under Section 101(b) includes respect for state water pollution policies that 
rely on the Clean Water Act to “protect[] downstream States from out-of-state pollution that they 
themselves cannot regulate.” See 547 U.S. at 777. 
 333. See ASWM 2018 Comments, supra note 328, at 4. 
 334. See Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 172–73. 
 335. Id. at 167. 
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3. Inappropriate reliance on the Rapanos plurality opinion 
The agencies also inappropriately relied on Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion 
in Rapanos as the basis for the proposed Step Two rulemaking. In reliance on 
the plurality opinion, they defined “waters of the United States” to be limited to 
relatively permanent waters and wetlands with a continuous surface connection 
to traditional navigable waters.336 In further reliance on the plurality opinion, 
they eliminated the case-by-case application of the significant nexus test from 
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Rapanos as a means of determining 
jurisdiction over tributaries, adjacent wetlands, and other waters,337 they 
redefined “tributary” to eliminate jurisdiction for ephemeral streams,338 and they 
rejected subsurface hydrologic connections between waters as a basis for 
jurisdiction.339 The agencies inappropriately based the proposed rulemaking on 
the Rapanos plurality opinion, rather than Justice Kennedy’s concurring 
opinion.340 
The agencies refused to rely on Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in 
Rapanos as the basis for the Step Two rule because they claimed it was “the 
opinion of a single Justice.”341 However, the four dissenting Justices in Rapanos, 
wrote that they would find jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act whenever a 
water would be regulated under Justice Kennedy’s tests or under the plurality’s 
tests.342 Consequently, five of the nine Justices in Rapanos would utilize Justice 
 
 336. Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg. 4154, 4170 (proposed 
Feb. 14, 2019) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328). 
 337. Id. 
 338. Id. at 4172–73. 
 339. See Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 4188. 
 340. As noted earlier, Justice Kennedy argued that the “significant nexus” test that was 
established in SWANCC was the appropriate test for determining jurisdiction over “waters of the 
United States.” See supra notes 69–76, and accompanying text. As he wrote, “[t]aken together, 
these cases establish that in some instances, as exemplified by Riverside Bayview, the connection 
between a nonnavigable water or wetland and a navigable water may be so close, or potentially so 
close, that the Corps may deem the water or wetland a “navigable water” under the Act. In other 
instances, as exemplified by SWANCC, there may be little or no connection. Absent a significant 
nexus, jurisdiction under the Act is lacking.” See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 767 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). The “significant nexus” test, he argued, “prevents problematic applications of the 
statute.” Id. at 783. Justice Kennedy was concerned that the plurality’s test did not give sufficient 
deference to Congress’ purposes in enacting the Clean Water Act. 
 341. Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg. 4154, 4196 (proposed 
Feb. 14, 2019) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328). 
 342. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 787, 810 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissenting Justices would 
have upheld broader regulation of waters than the plurality or Justice Kennedy, id. at 788, and 
would have upheld the government’s regulations at issue in the case under Chevron v. NRDC, 467 
U.S. 837 (1984), but nevertheless indicated that the waters identified in either the plurality or 
Kennedy opinions would be “waters of the United States” under their broader reading of Clean 
Water Act jurisdiction. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 810 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test as one method of determining jurisdiction 
under the Clean Water Act. 
From the time of the Rapanos decision until the proposed Step Two 
rulemaking, in light of the dissent’s counsel, EPA and the Corps interpreted the 
Rapanos decision to authorize the federal government to regulate waters under 
the Clean Water Act if they satisfied either Justice Kennedy’s “significant 
nexus” test or the plurality test.343 The agencies admitted, in their notice of 
proposed rulemaking for the Step Two rule, that they consistently adopted a 
broad interpretation of Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test to support 
findings of jurisdiction under the Act,344 and the agencies have been very 
successful defending their interpretation in court. All of the federal appellate 
courts that have ruled on the question have held that the agencies can rely on the 
Kennedy test exclusively345 or on the Kennedy and plurality tests to determine 
Clean Water Act jurisdiction over “waters of the United States.”346 None of the 
courts has held that the agencies should rely solely on the plurality opinion. In 
addition, at oral argument before the Supreme Court in Hughes v. United States, 
while the agencies were finalizing the proposed Step One rulemaking, counsel 
for the United States cited the Rapanos decision and argued that divided 
opinions of the Supreme Court should be interpreted in the manner that the 
Corps and EPA consistently interpreted Rapanos until the proposed Step Two 
rulemaking.347 And yet, in the proposed Step Two rulemaking, the agencies 
rejected the interpretation that prevailed in all of the federal appellate courts and 
proposed an interpretation that has been rejected by all of those courts. To the 
extent that the agencies’ proposed rule rejects the Kennedy test in favor of the 
Rapanos plurality, the rule is outside of the agencies’ statutory authority. 
4. Failure to Rationally Explain Departure from Prior Legal 
Interpretations 
While the agencies’ proposed rule is outside of their statutory authority, the 
agencies also acted arbitrarily and capriciously in changing their interpretation 
 
 343. See JOHNSON, COURSE SOURCE, supra note 59, at 140–43. 
 344. See Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg. at 4167. 
 345. See, e.g., Cordiano v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc., 575 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2009); United States 
v. Robison, 505 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 346. See JOHNSON, COURSE SOURCE, supra note 59, at 142. 
 347. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 28–29, 35, 47–48, 50–52, Hughes v. United States, 
138 U.S. 1765 (2018), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2017 
/17-155_g314.pdf [https://perma.cc/3AHL-88K8] [hereinafter “Transcript of Oral Argument”]. 
The Supreme Court granted cert in Hughes to decide “[w]hether [the] Court’s decision in Marks 
means that the concurring opinion in a 4–1–4 decision represents the holding of the Court where 
neither the plurality’s reasoning nor the concurrence’s reasoning is a logical subset of the other.” 
See Hughes, 138 U.S. at 1772. Ultimately, the Court decided the case without resolving that 
question. Id. 
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of the Clean Water Act and the Supreme Court WOTUS decisions that supported 
the 2015 rule without rationally explaining the reasons for the change. As the 
Supreme Court noted in Encino Motorcars, “[a]gencies are free to change their 
existing policies as long as they provide a reasoned explanation for the change 
. . . [b]ut the agency must at least ‘display awareness that it is changing its 
position’ and ‘show that there are good reasons for the new policy.’”348 “[A]n 
‘[u]nexplained inconsistency’ in agency policy is a reason for holding an 
interpretation to be an arbitrary and capricious change from agency practice.”349 
The agencies argued, in the notice of proposed rulemaking, that a revised 
rulemaking based on a change in policy is well within an agency’s discretion 
and that a change in administration brought about by people casting their votes 
is a perfectly reasonable basis for an executive agency’s reappraisal of its 
regulations.350 While a change in administration may be a reasonable basis for a 
reappraisal of regulations, a change in administration alone cannot be a 
reasonable basis for a change in regulations. 
The agencies acknowledged that they were changing their interpretation of 
their authority under the Clean Water Act and their interpretations of the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Rapanos and Solid Waste Agency of Northern 
Cook County in several regards.351 To support their changing positions, they 
argued that they “re-evaluated their legal authority and those policies that they 
deem most important in shaping the jurisdiction of the Clean Water Act: 
prioritizing the text of the statute, adherence to constitutional limitations, 
including the autonomy of the states, and providing clarity to the regulated 
community.”352  
However, all of the Supreme Court decisions that the agencies claimed 
impacted their changed interpretation of the Clean Water Act were decided 
before the agencies adopted the interpretations of the Act that they were 
changing in the proposed rulemaking. The interpretations that were being 
changed were adopted by the agencies in response to those cases. Subsequently, 
all of the circuit courts that reviewed the agencies’ interpretations that were 
being changed upheld the interpretations that the agencies were changing. It is 
disingenuous, therefore, for the agencies to say that the change is rooted in the 
Court’s decisions. 
In addition, although the agencies claimed to be changing the interpretations 
of the Clean Water Act to reduce confusion and provide clarity,353 the agencies 
 
 348. See Encino, 136 U.S. at 2125–26. 
 349. Id. 
 350. See Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg. 4154, 4169 
(proposed Feb. 14, 2019) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 358). 
 351. See, e.g., Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg. at 4167, 4169. 
 352. Id. at 4169. 
 353. See id. at 4154. 
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adopted the 2015 rule to reduce confusion and provide clarity.354 The agencies 
claimed that the 2015 rule could not reduce confusion and provide clarity 
because it was challenged in several courts.355 However, if the agencies finalize 
the Step Two rule to replace the 2015 rule, it will be challenged in court as well 
and will not reduce confusion or provide clarity any more than the 2015 rule 
once it has been challenged. When the agencies, in 2018, adopted a rule that 
attempted to suspend the 2015 rule for two years (the “suspension rule”), they 
justified it on the grounds that it would reduce confusion and provide clarity.356 
However, that rule was immediately challenged and, within three months, a 
federal district court in South Carolina held that it was invalid and issued a 
nationwide injunction against its enforcement.357 As a result of that ruling, at the 
time of the Step Two proposal, the 2015 rule was in force in twenty-two states, 
while being enjoined in the remaining states by a variety of district courts 
reviewing challenges to the 2015 rule.358 The suspension rule did not provide 
clarity or reduce confusion and neither will the agencies’ proposed Step Two 
rulemaking. 
Looking beyond the facade of reasons provided by the agencies for the 
change in interpretation of the Clean Water Act, it is clear that the real reason 
for the agencies’ change in position was the Executive Order issued by President 
Trump,359 which, in essence, directed the agencies to repeal the 2015 rule and 
replace it with a rule that adopts the reasoning of the plurality opinion in 
Rapanos. Congress delegated EPA and the Corps, rather than the President, the 
authority to adopt regulations to administer the Clean Water Act.360 It wanted 
 
 354. See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054, 
37,055–57 (June 29, 2015) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328). 
 355. See Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,”84 Fed. Reg. 4154, 4197 
(proposed Feb. 14, 2019) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328). 
 356. See Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Addition of an Applicability Date to 
2015 Clean Water Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 5200, 5202 (Feb. 6, 2018) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 
328). 
 357. See South Carolina Coastal Conservation League v. Pruitt, 318 F. Supp. 3d 959 (D.S.C. 
2018). 
 358. See Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Preexisting Rules, 84 
Fed. Reg. 56,626, 56,630 (Oct. 22, 2019) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 358). 
 359. See Exec. Order No. 13,778, 82 Fed. Reg. 12497 (Mar. 3, 2017). 
 360. See 33 U.S.C. § 1361(a) (2012). Congress occasionally delegates authority directly to the 
President, rather than administrative agencies. See, e.g., Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 
1973, Pub. L. No. 93–159, 87 Stat. 627, (repealed); Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, 
Pub. L. No. 94–163, 89 Stat. 817. However, Congress did not delegate the authority to define 
“waters of the United States” in the Clean Water Act to the President. For extended discussions 
regarding the power of the President to direct agency decision-making, see Cary Coglianese, The 
Emptiness of Decisional Limits: Reconceiving Presidential Control of the Administrative State, 69 
ADMIN. L. REV. 43 (20170; Johnson, Disclosing the President’ Role in Rulemaking, supra note 1; 
Strauss, supra note 1, at 696–97; Stack, supra note 1, at 264; Kagan, supra note 1; Calabresi & 
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the agencies to exercise their expertise to determine important scientific and 
policy questions like those intertwined in the statutory definition of waters of the 
United States. To the extent that the agencies’ interpretation change was based 
solely on the Executive Order, the agencies’ change in position is arbitrary and 
capricious. 
Ultimately, the agencies justified their rulemaking changes on their incorrect 
reading of Rapanos v. United States. When an agency adopts a rule based on a 
mis-reading of precedent and fails to justify its rule on other grounds, a court 
will invalidate the agency’s rule.361 In SEC v. Chenery Corporation, the 
Supreme Court struck down a decision of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission because the agency had failed to exercise its expertise in 
interpreting and administering the Public Utility Holding Act, but relied, instead, 
on a flawed reading of judicial precedent interpreting the statute.362 “It is well 
established that an agency’s action must be upheld, if at all, on the basis 
articulated by the agency itself.”363 Since the agencies proposed to make several 
changes to the 2015 rule based on their erroneous reading of the Rapanos case 
and did not provide any justification for the proposed rules based on their 
expertise or other rational grounds, the agencies’ proposed changes, if adopted, 
will be void in light of the absence of a rational explanation to justify the 
changes. 
5. Failure to Rationally Explain Changed Interpretation of the Science 
Behind the 2015 Rule  
In their notice of proposed rulemaking, the agencies did not rationally 
explain why they changed their interpretation of the science that supported the 
2015 rule. In the 2015 rule,364 and earlier, in the guidance applying the 
significant nexus test on a case by case basis,365 the agencies provided strong 
scientific support for their decisions to adopt a broad definition of tributaries,366 
to regulate adjacent wetlands based on hydrological and ecological connections 
other than surface connections,367 and to assert jurisdiction over other waters 
 
Prakash, supra note 1; Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 1; Bruff, supra note 1 (outlining the 
arguments in favor of, and opposing Presidential control over agency decision-making). 
 361. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88–93 (1943). 
 362. Id. 
 363. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs’ Ass’n v. State Farm Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 50 (1983). 
 364. See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054, 
37,054 (June 29, 2015) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. 328). 
 365. See U.S. EPA & U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Clean Water Act Jurisdiction Following 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision in Rapanos v. United States & Carabell v. United States (Dec. 
2, 2008), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-02/documents/cwa_jurisdiction_follow 
ing_rapanos120208.pdf [https://perma.cc/XK7M-B9HV]. 
 366. See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. at 
37,058–69. 
 367. Id. at 37,069–70. 
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that the agencies determine, on a case by case basis, have a significant nexus to 
waters of the United States.368 In their Step Two proposal, the agencies rejected 
those prior decisions and did not explain how the science changed or why the 
prior scientific conclusions could not be supported any more. Instead, they made 
a few passing references to comments of EPA’s Science Advisory Board on the 
Connectivity Study as evidence that the proposal is “informed by science,” but 
they stressed that the questions to be decided by the agencies are legal questions, 
rather than scientific questions.369 The agencies’ failure to engage with the 
science and explain why the agencies no longer find the science to support the 
rule is unreasonable. 
Although the definition of “waters of the United States” is a legal and policy 
decision, the Supreme Court resolved the legal question to a large degree in 
Rapanos and Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County, when it held that 
the “significant nexus” test is the test for determining jurisdiction over “waters 
of the United States” under the Clean Water Act. The determination of whether 
waters have a “significant nexus” to traditional navigable waters is 
predominantly a scientific question, rather than a legal question. In Rapanos, 
Justice Kennedy wrote that the “significant nexus” required for Clean Water Act 
jurisdiction “must be assessed in terms of the statute’s goals and purposes . . . to 
restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the 
Nation’s waters . . . .”370 As outlined in an earlier section of this Article, in 
Kennedy’s opinion, he outlined a science-based test that was drawn from the 
goals and purposes of the law.371 It is clear, from his opinion, that he believed 
that science is central to the determination of when waters, alone or in 
combination with similarly situated lands in the region, significantly affect the 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other navigable waters. 
The agencies recognized their responsibility to support their interpretation 
of the term “waters of the United States” with sound science when they adopted 
the 2015 rule and relied on the Connectivity Study to determine which waters 
have a “significant nexus” to traditional navigable waters.372 If, in the Step Two 
rulemaking, they are rejecting positions that they took to apply that test in the 
past and justified based on science, they cannot ignore the scientific conclusions 
 
 368. Id. at 37,071–73. 
 369. See Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg. 4154, 4175 
(proposed Feb. 14, 2019) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328) (definition of “waters of the United 
States” is a legal and policy decision). Id. at 4197 (noting that “the 2015 Rule may have failed to 
appropriately recognize that the science in the Connectivity Report . . . is not dispositive in 
interpreting the statutory reach of ‘waters of the United States,’ which is ultimately a legal 
determination.”). 
 370. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 779. 
 371. See supra notes 233–40 and accompanying text. 
 372. See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37, 054, 
37,054–55 (June 29, 2015) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328). 
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that they reached in the past, but must explain how the science supporting their 
decisions has changed or why the science no longer supports their prior 
decisions. The agencies failed to do that in the proposed rulemaking. The 
agencies cited individual statements from the Science Advisory Board’s review 
of the Connectivity Study regarding degrees of connectivity to justify their 
decision to exclude regulation of ephemeral streams,373 and to support their 
definition of adjacent wetlands,374 but those isolated statements conflicted with 
the great weight of the science that the agencies relied on in crafting the 2015 
rule. 
VIII.  WILL WOTUS RETURN TO THE SUPREME COURT? 
In the past four years, EPA and the Corps have initiated and/or finalized four 
rulemakings to define, postpone, repeal, or redefine “waters of the United 
States” under the Clean Water Act. Two of the rulemakings that have been 
finalized have been challenged in court, and it is likely that the other two 
rulemakings will be challenged in court as well when finalized. Since the 
Supreme Court has addressed the scope of Clean Water Act jurisdiction three 
times in the last three and a half decades and since the Court’s Rapanos decision 
has proved to be confusing in its application, it would not be surprising to see a 
challenge to one of the agencies’ rulemakings eventually finding its way back to 
the Supreme Court, but it may be several years before that happens, in light of 
the Court’s ruling in the National Association of Manufacturers case that 
challenging the rules must originate in the federal district courts.  
It is clear that the applicability date rulemaking will not be challenged in the 
Supreme Court, as the agencies have abandoned defense of the rule, focusing 
instead on the Step One repeal and Step Two replacement rules. It is also very 
unlikely that a challenge to the 2015 rule will be heard by the Supreme Court. 
The agencies are refusing to defend the 2015 rule on the merits and the agencies 
finalized the rule that repeals the 2015 rule and will perhaps even finalize the 
rule that replaces the 2015 rule before challenges to the 2015 rule work their 
way up to the federal appellate courts, thus mooting out challenges to the 2015 
rule.375 Similarly, it is unlikely that a challenge to the Step One repeal rule will 
be heard by the Supreme Court because the agencies plan to finalize the Step 
Two replacement rule shortly after finalizing the repeal rule, mooting out 
 
 373. See Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg. 4154, 4176 
(proposed Feb. 14, 2019) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328). 
 374. Id. at 4187. 
 375. Forecasting in this area becomes very difficult, though, because judicial invalidation of 
the repeal and replacement rules could resurrect the 2015 rule, at which point, challenges to the 
2015 rule would not be moot. 
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challenges to the repeal rule.376 Thus, if the Supreme Court decides to wade back 
in to resolve the scope of the “waters of the United States” under the Clean Water 
Act, it will most likely be in the context of reviewing challenges to the agencies’ 
Step Two replacement rule. Since the rule may not be finalized until 2020377 and 
challenges to the rule must work their way through the federal trial and appellate 
levels, it is unlikely that the Court will hear challenges to the rule before the end 
of the current Administration and there may be additional changes to the 
membership of the Court before a challenge to the rule reaches the Court. Even 
if the composition of the Court does not change before a challenge to the 
agencies’ Step Two rule reaches the Court, it is difficult to predict how the Court 
will rule on the challenge, especially since the agencies have not yet finalized 
the Step Two rule. Nevertheless, assuming that the agencies finalize the rule in 
a manner that is similar to the proposed rule, without addressing the flaws 
outlined above, it is likely that the outcome of the case will depend largely on 
the leanings of Justice Kavanaugh.  
There have been four changes in the composition of the Court since the 
Rapanos decision. Justices Stevens, Souter, Scalia and Kennedy have been 
replaced, respectively, by Justices Kagan, Sotomayor, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. 
Justice Kennedy’s absence will be the most significant, since he will not be 
around to defend his Rapanos concurrence and clarify the manner in which he 
envisioned the “significant nexus” test should be applied. There is little in the 
voting history of Justices Kagan or Sotomayor that would suggest that they 
would support the agencies’ interpretation of the Clean Water Act in a Step Two 
rule if the interpretation ignored Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in 
Rapanos and ignored the purposes of Section 101(a) of the Act, so one might 
assume that they would join Justice Breyer and Justice Ginsburg’s call in the 
Rapanos dissent for an interpretation of the Act based on science that advances 
the objectives of section 101(a). The remainder of this part of the Article, 
therefore, focuses on the potential reactions of Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh 
to a challenge to the Step Two rule.  
 
 376. Once again, though, if the replacement rule is invalidated and the repeal rule has not 
already been invalidated, the pre-2015 regulations would be put back in place pursuant to the repeal 
rule and challenges to the repeal rule would not be moot. 
 377. See David Schultz, Busy Summer Planned at EPA for New Water Regulations, 
BLOOMBERG ENV’T (May 22, 2019), https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/environment-and-
energy/busy-summer-planned-at-epa-for-new-water-regulations [https://perma.cc/LS5L-7LMS]. 
It is possible, though, that the agencies may never finalize the Step Two rule. When they finalized 
the Step One rule, they wrote, “[t]hough this final rule is intended to be the first step in a 
comprehensive, two-step rulemaking process, the agencies acknowledge that they cannot prejudge 
the outcome of the separate rulemaking on a proposed revised definition of ‘waters of the United 
States.’” Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Preexisting Rules, 84 Fed. 
Reg. 56,626, 56,661(Oct. 22, 2019) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328). At two other points in the 
preamble to the final Step One rule, the agencies noted that it is possible that the Step Two rule 
may not be finalized. Id. at 56,654, 56,665. 
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While the Court could use the occasion to clarify the weight that courts 
should give to a concurring opinion like Justice Kennedy’s under the Marks test, 
the Court punted on that question in a similar case last term, Hughes v. United 
States, preferring, instead, to resolve the statutory interpretation question anew, 
without focusing on the precedent.378 Since they took that approach so recently 
in Hughes, it is likely that they will take a similar approach in a challenge to the 
Step Two rulemaking and resolve the statutory question in the case without 
determining the weight to accord to Justice Kennedy’s Rapanos concurrence.  
A challenge to the agencies’ Step Two rule would likely include a challenge 
to the agencies’ statutory interpretation, as well as a challenge to the agencies’ 
change in position regarding the statutory interpretation and interpretation of the 
legal precedent in Riverside-Bayview Homes, SWANCC, and Rapanos, and 
maybe even a challenge to the agencies’ change in position regarding the science 
supporting the 2015 rule. Although Justice Roberts encouraged the agencies in 
Rapanos to adopt a rulemaking to clarify the definition of “waters of the United 
States” and asserted that the agencies would receive “generous leeway” under 
Chevron if they followed that approach,379 it is hard to imagine that a majority 
of the Court would uphold the agencies’ Step Two rule under Chevron, even if 
they ultimately upheld the rule. Justice Gorsuch has been an outspoken critic of 
Chevron even before he was appointed to the Court, suggesting that it violates 
separation of powers and the non-delegation doctrine,380 and he has continued 
his criticism of the doctrine while on the Court.381 
Justice Kavanaugh has not been as vocal as Justice Gorsuch, but Court 
watchers suggest that Kavanaugh generally views agencies’ authority narrowly 
based on separation of powers concerns382 and suggest that he is more likely 
than many judges to find a statute clear at step one of Chevron if the Court 
 
 378. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 347, at 28–29, 35, 47–48, 50–52. 
 379. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 731 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 380. See Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1149. Judge Gorsuch outlined his concerns in a 
concurring opinion that he authored separately, despite writing the majority opinion in the case. 
 381. See Evan A. Young, Natural Resources Development and the Administrative State: 
Navigating Federal Agency Regulation and Litigation, 10–2 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Fdn. 24–25 (2019). 
In his dissenting opinion in BNSF Railway Co. v. Loos, Justice Gorsuch questioned whether 
Chevron “retain[ed] any force” and congratulated the Court for deciding the statutory interpretation 
question on its own, without relying on Chevron. See 139 U.S. 893, 908 (2019). Justice Thomas 
was a member of the plurality in Rapanos, and is a vocal critic of Chevron, see Michigan v. EPA, 
135 U.S. 2699, 2712–14 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring), so, even if he were to support the 
agencies’ Step Two rulemaking, he would also not likely do so based on according Chevron 
deference to the agency. 
 382. See Christopher Walker, Judge Kavanaugh on Administrative Law and Separation of 
Powers, SCOTUS BLOG (July 26, 2018), https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/07/kavanaugh-on-ad 
ministrative-law-and-separation-of-powers/ [https://perma.cc/S5G7-AB5E]. 
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applies that test.383 In his own writings, Justice Kavanaugh has suggested that 
agencies might be accorded more deference in Chevron cases when Congress 
uses broad, open-ended terms like “reasonable,” “appropriate,” “feasible,” or 
“practicable,” than when agencies are interpreting a specific statutory term or 
phrase.384 If he applies that approach in a case examining the meaning of “waters 
of the United States,” one would assume that the agencies’ interpretation of that 
phrase would be an interpretation of a specific statutory term or phrase, to which 
little deference should be accorded.385 While there are indications, therefore, that 
neither Justice Gorsuch nor Justice Kavanaugh would be likely uphold the 
agencies’ Step Two rule under Chevron, that by no means suggests that they 
would invalidate the rule, as they could interpret the Clean Water Act on their 
own to find support for the agencies’ statutory interpretation. Based on Justice 
Gorsuch’s prior criticism of the breadth of the over-reach of federal agencies,386 
it is not difficult to imagine that he could find textual support in the Clean Water 
Act for the narrowed definition of “waters of the United States” in the 
replacement rule.  
Although Justice Kavanaugh would likely claim that the scope of federal 
jurisdiction over “waters of the United States” is a straightforward statutory 
interpretation question, it is not inconceivable that his statutory analysis could 
be influenced by his views on federalism and property rights. At this point, it is 
difficult to fully discern Kavanaugh’s views on federalism, but he is a frequent 
 
 383. See Walker, supra note 382. Walker noted that Kavanaugh suggested, in a lecture in 2018, 
that while some judges might only find that a statute is clear if they are ninety percent certain that 
the statute has a specific meaning, he probably applies “something approaching a 65/35 rule or 
60/40 rule,” meaning that he could find that the statute is clear, so no deference to the agency 
interpretation is due, if he is 60–65 percent certain that the statute has a specific meaning (using the 
normal tools of statutory interpretation). Id. Justice Kavanaugh fears that judges may be swayed by 
policy considerations in determining whether a statute is ambiguous, such that deference to 
agencies is required, so he prefers to avoid finding ambiguity at Step One in light of the lack of a 
“neutral method to evaluate whether a text is clear of ambiguous.” See Young, supra note 381, at 
27 (citing Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2139 
(2016)). 
 384. See Kavanaugh, supra note 383, at 2153–54. See also Walker, supra note 382. 
 385. Professor Christopher Walker also suggests that Justice Kavanaugh has “expressed a 
strong version of the major questions doctrine” and would be likely to join Chief Justice Roberts’ 
call “for a narrower, more context-specific Chevron.” See Walker, supra note 382. Although the 
hyperbole surrounding the “expansion” of Clean Water Act jurisdiction under the 2015 rule might 
be used to frame that rule as implicating a “major question,” see Dave Owen, Myths, Realities and 
the Clean Water Rule Controversy, CPR BLOG (Mar. 6, 2017), www.progressivereform.org/CPR 
Blog.cfm?idBlog=DD010B48-A4C0-DC67-13FC0F22E6E0C020 [https://perma.cc/732C-H5R3]. 
EPA and the Corps would likely argue that the rollback of jurisdiction in the Step Two rule was 
not a “major question,” so the agencies’ rule should not be exempt from Chevron on that ground. 
 386. See, e.g., Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1149–1158. 
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critic of federal regulation387 and the American Legislative Exchange Council388 
and some commentators have suggested that he is a strong supporter of states’ 
rights.389 It is similarly difficult to determine Justice Kavanaugh’s views on 
property rights,390 but the Property Rights Alliance391 and some commentators 
have suggested that he is a strong supporter of property rights.392 If Kavanaugh 
proves to be a champion of states’ rights and/or property rights, it is likely that 
he could be persuaded that Section 101(b) of the Clean Water Act should be read 
to narrow the agencies’ jurisdiction over “waters of the United States” as they 
assert in the replacement rule.  
However, even if Justice Kavanaugh were to agree with the statutory 
interpretation advocated by the agencies in the replacement rule, he could only 
vote to uphold their change in interpretation if he concluded that they rationally 
explained their change in the legal and factual basis for the 2015 rule. Professor 
Christopher Walker predicts that Justice Kavanaugh will “put a tighter leash on 
the regulatory state,” whether agencies are regulating or de-regulating.393 He, 
and others, argue that Justice Kavanaugh’s Circuit Court opinions demonstrate 
that he takes the State Farm hard look arbitrary and capricious analysis very 
seriously and requires agencies to fully justify their changes in regulatory 
approaches.394 If those predictions are correct, it will be very difficult for Justice 
 
 387. See Politico Staff, Brett Kavanaugh’s Track Record, POLITICO (July 9, 2018), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/07/09/brett-kavanaugh-track-record-675294 [https://perma. 
cc/4VXW-CMVB]; Jonathan H. Adler, Will Kavanaugh Curb Sloppy White House Deregulation?, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/16/opinion/brett-kavanaugh-su 
preme-court-administrative-state.html [https://perma.cc/2SWV-UHN8]. 
 388. See Graham Vyse, What Brett Kavanaugh Means for States, GOVERNING (Sept. 4, 2018), 
https://www.governing.com/topics/politics/gov-kavanaugh-states-confirmation-hearing-jus 
tice.html [https://perma.cc/A8N7-VYZ3]. 
 389. See Elaine S. Povich & Alayna Alvarez, What Trump’s Pick for Supreme Court Could 
Mean for States’ Rights, PEW: STATELINE (July 11, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-
and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2018/07/11/what-trumps-pick-for-supreme-court-could-mean-for-
states-rights [https://perma.cc/ZP4V-RFVA]. 
 390. See Andrew Nolan & Caitlin Devereaux Lewis, Judge Brett M. Kavanaugh: His 
Jurisprudence and Potential Impact on the Supreme Court (R45293), CONG. RES. SERV. (Aug. 21, 
2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45293.pdf [https://perma.cc/59E5-XJNB]. 
 391. See Brogan Feeley, Brett Kavanaugh and Property Rights, PROP. RTS. ALLIANCE (July 
17, 2018), https://www.propertyrightsalliance.org/news/brett-kavanaugh-and-property-rights/ 
[https://perma.cc/PJH7-BTVT]. 
 392. See, e.g., Dick Patten, Brett Kavanaugh Will Be Very Good For Property Rights, WASH. 
EXAMINER (Sept. 1, 2018), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/op-eds/brett-kava 
naugh-will-be-very-good-for-property-rights [https://perma.cc/5FYK-87GB]; Post Opinions Staff, 




 393. See Walker, supra note 382. 
 394. Id. See also Young, supra note 381, at 25–26; Adler, supra note 387. 
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Kavanaugh to vote to uphold the agencies replacement rule, due to their lack of 
any explanation for their abrupt changes from the 2015 rule other than politics. 
As noted earlier, though, it could be several years before challenges to one of 
the agencies’ WOTUS rules returns to the Court and there could be additional 
changes to the membership of the Court by then. One thing is clear, though. 
Unless Congress amends the Clean Water Act, which is unlikely, none of the 
agencies’ WOTUS rulemakings are likely to provide clarity, consistency, or 
certainty to the regulated community and the public until the Supreme Court re-
enters the fray.395  
  
 
 395. The EPA and Corps finalized their “Step 2” rule while this Article was going to press. 
Therefore, this Article does not address the changes made by the agencies between the proposed 
and final rulemaking. 
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